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3Foreword
The majority of the world’s nations offer some form of tax incentive for donors. This global consensus 
suggests that governments recognise that charitable giving is important. 
The ability of civil society organisations (CSOs) to raise resources and achieve financial independence 
must be considered a pre-requisite to building a civil society that is able to be both effective 
and sustainable in the long term. Charitable donations are a vital source of funding for many 
organisations and as such, understanding how the tax system can be harnessed to incentivise donors 
should be seen as an important piece of the puzzle when it comes to developing the capacity of civil 
society globally.
It would be wrong to suggest that creating a healthy civil society is simply a matter of adequate 
financing. A culture of community activism, political engagement, volunteerism and the freedom of 
association and assembly provides the foundation on which civil society rests. However, it would also 
be wrong to view tax incentives for giving as being separate from the wider policy landscape affecting 
CSOs and donors.
It is our hope that by exploring the benefits and weaknesses of differing approaches to incentivising 
charitable giving we can help to inform a lively debate around the world about how best to increase 
the resources available for civil society. Comparing systems for incentivising giving should broaden 
thinking and help to challenge unhelpful assumptions. 
Is a global organisation working to promote giving and support the growth of civil society, CAF 
has a keen interest in this debate. Our Future World Giving programme attempts to examine how 
governments and non governmental organisations can promote a vibrant civil society and foster the 
culture of giving which can sustain it. As economies grow and millions more people have incomes 
which afford them the opportunity to give, these questions become ever more pressing. 
By comparing the tax incentive systems of 26 different nations, this report – the third in our Future 
World Giving series – attempts to develop a more holistic understanding of the efficacy of different 
approaches. Unlike other studies of tax incentives for giving, this report attempts to put tax incentives 
in the wider policy context. In doing so, we consider not only the value of incentives but also how that 
value differs for different donors, what causes are incentivised and how accessible incentives are.
Building on Rules to Give By – a report we produced with Nexus and McDermott Will & Emery that 
looks at the basic legal environment for giving in all 193 UN recognised nations – this report looks in 
depth not only at the availability and value of tax incentives for giving but also considers the political 
justifications for those incentives, the range of causes available to donors and the fairness of the 
system as a whole. I look forward to seeing how it influences the debate on how we motivate more 
people to give ever more generously and effectively.
Dr John Low
Chief Executive
Charities Aid Foundation
4Contents
Executive Summary 5
1. Introduction 9
 
2. Justifying incentives 11
 2.1 Tax Base Rationale 12
 2.2 Subsidy Rationale 12 
 2.3 Pluralism Rationale 13
3. Assessing the efficacy of incentives 15
4. Eligibility of beneficiary organisations 18
 4.1 Patchwork vs Staircase systems 18
 4.2 Inclusive versus exclusive frameworks for designating eligibility 19
 4.3 Political/executive discretion in eligibility by charitable purpose 20
 4.4 Cross border giving 25
5. Value of incentives 33
 5.1 Rate of taxation 33
 5.2 Rate of incentive 35 
 5.3 Monetary effect on incentives on donations 36
6. Caps and floors on relief 48 
 6.1 Capped relief 48 
 6.2 Progressiveness of caps 49
 6.3 Minimum qualifying donation? 50
7. Form of relief 52
 7.1 Deduction 53
 7.2 Credits 55 
 7.3 Hybrid systems 57
 7.4 Supplementary forms of relief 58
8. Barriers to claiming incentives 60
 8.1 Bureaucratic barriers 60
 8.2 Complexity 60
9. Incentives for individuals vs incentives for companies 62
 9.1 Incentivising only one type of donor 62
 9.2 The value of corporate vs individual incentives 63
 9.3 Different processes for claiming incentives 64
10. Conclusion 66
5Executive Summary
Key findings
1. The balance of evidence suggests that people and corporations are responsive to 
incentives. The presence of incentives has been shown to positively influence the frequency 
of donations by individuals with people in countries with tax incentives being 12 percentage 
points more likely (33 per cent); than those that offer no incentives (21 per cent) to have made 
a donation in the past month. In addition, more generous incentives generally lead to higher 
donor responsiveness. Both experimental data and analysis from historical records in the United 
States show that when the marginal cost of giving falls (i.e. the value of incentives increases) 
people tend to increase the size of their donations. 
 
2. Incentives for giving cannot be understood as an alternative model of public service 
delivery. Justifying incentives for giving on the basis that they can expand the provision of 
services that might otherwise be provided by government misunderstands the value of giving 
and could lead to negative unintended consequences for civil society. To do so benefits neither 
government nor civil society. Though incentives can be articulated as a tax expenditure the 
idea that incentives for giving are merely an alternative funding mechanism for state services 
mischaracterises the strengths and weaknesses of civil society which cannot be understood as a 
proxy for government service provision.  
3. Tax incentives are not the most important policy lever in motivating giving. Factors such 
as the legal environment in which civil society operates, the range of causes which are 
incentivised, administrative barriers to giving and the ability of organisations to fundraise 
publically are likely to be more important in motivating giving than tax incentives. 
4. Tax incentives are being used to side-line certain parts of civil society. The politicisation of 
tax incentives whereby legitimate causes which do not align with the government’s agenda 
are ineligible for or receive less favourable donor incentivised status, is damaging to the 
independence of civil society. Such politicisation of incentives is contributing to the closing 
space for civil society globally. 
5. Awarding donor-incentivised status to state controlled organisations erodes confidence in 
giving. A number of countries in our study offer tax incentives exclusively, or at a favourable 
rate to organisations which are delivering government projects, are affiliated to government or 
are wholly government controlled. This undermines the very independence of civil society that 
allows it to build trust with the public. 
6. Higher tax nations offer more compelling incentives (assuming that deductions or credits 
are equal to the rate of taxation). There is evidence that as the rate of income tax increases 
(assuming incentives rules stay the same) people are likely to give more as the marginal cost 
of giving decreases. This is particularly true for those in the highest income categories. As 
such, tax incentives in lower tax nations my be less effective and other strategies – such as 
match funding – may be preferable. Behavioural sciences may provide the most cost effective 
solutions to motivating greater giving. 
7. Complexity in claiming incentives limits donor responsiveness. The effectiveness of tax 
incentive regimes in many countries is undermined by the difficulty that many donors face in 
claiming them. Complex procedures for claiming, a lack of guidance, the requirement to fill in 
detailed tax returns, regional variations and complex systems whereby causes receive differing 
tax treatments can harm donor responsiveness. 
68. Tax deductions are the preferred method of incentive globally. Three quarters of the 
countries in this study (18 of the 24 which offer incentives) offer incentives in the form of tax 
deductions. The deductive approach has several perceived advantages including simplicity from 
the point of tax authorities and a natural weighting towards higher income audiences where a 
higher responsiveness is assumed. However, this assumption does not necessarily stand up to 
scrutiny and in any case may lead to a system that lacks progressiveness. 
9. Most countries weigh pragmatism above concerns about progressiveness in designing 
their incentive regime. A pragmatic approach to policy which favours efficiency and perceived 
responsiveness in wealthy individuals and corporations has led to inequality in both the 
value of incentives and the ability to claim them which might have a chilling effect on mass 
engagement in giving. A system where those with the greatest ability to afford to donate 
receive the greatest incentives to do so may lead to a civil society that rather than representing 
those interests which are crowded out by the powerful in society, actively reinforces the existing 
socio-economic structure. 
10. Tax credits are the most progressive model for incentivising giving. Offered at a flat rate at 
the highest level of income tax, tax credits ensure those with the lowest incomes do not endure 
the highest marginal cost when donating.  
11. Hybrid systems – which mix deductive and credit based incentives – introduce unnecessary 
complexity. This complexity makes them more difficult for donors to comprehend and more 
expensive to administer. This undermines the benefits of both a deductive system – which 
benefits from simplicity and pragmatism, and a credit system – which should be progressive 
and accessible.  
12. Corporations see, on average, more favourable tax conditions for giving than individuals. 
Globally, according to the Rules to Give By Index, 77 per cent of nations offer some form of 
incentive to corporate donors whilst 66 per cent of nations offer some form of tax incentive 
to individuals. This study finds that the terms of those incentives tend to be – though not 
exclusively – more favourable for companies too. There are a number of possible explanations 
for this, ranging from a perception of greater responsiveness, belief by government officials 
that companies are more likely to support government aligned causes or simply the desire to 
attract business through a favourable tax environment. However, such sectoral favouritism 
may actually undermine corporate giving, as the public may come to view more favourable 
conditions for companies than they themselves enjoy with suspicion and thus the reputational 
effect of corporate giving may actually become negative. 
13. Globally, there is a wide variance of incentive values and cap levels. The value of incentives 
in the countries included in this report ranges from zero to 300 per cent of the value of income 
tax; whilst caps on what can be claimed by individuals range from 5 per cent to no cap at all. 
Caps on corporate giving vary even more widely from 0.5 per cent to no cap at all.  
14. Cross border giving is poorly incentivised. Tax incentives for cross border giving to foreign civil 
society organisations are rare and even where they exist on paper they are often difficult or 
impossible to claim in practice. In many transitional economies donors are not allowed to claim 
incentives even for domestically registered organisations that operate abroad.  
7Summary of Recommendations
Recommendations for each Future World Giving report are divided into three ‘tiers’. At the end of the 
project we will bring all these recommendations together. The three tiers represent policy outcomes 
which are increasingly progressive in terms of creating an enabling environment for not-for-profit 
organisations. These tiers should help governments and those advocating for improved conditions for 
civil society to prioritise policy developments by seeking to implement recommendations in one tier 
before moving on to the next. Evaluating the policies of different countries against this framework will 
allow more effective international comparison and help to promote a healthy competition to meet 
universal standards. 
It is important that recommendations are proportionate to the socio-economic context of every country. 
We believe that all governments should aspire to implementing Tier 1 recommendations, which have 
only limited resource implications. Governments in countries which have rapidly growing civil societies 
should prioritise meeting all of the recommendations in Tier 2 to future proof the sector and maximise 
its potential. Similarly, governments in advanced economies with a strong history and culture of 
philanthropy should not be complacent about the continuing development of policies which encourage 
greater public engagement in giving. To this extent, implementing all the recommendations in Tier 3 
should be the long term goal for every nation.
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
UNDERSTANDING INCENTIVES
Governments should develop a clear, evidenced and consistent rationale for incentives which is both progressive and sustainable in 
the long term 
All governments should commit to 
encouraging giving and have a clear 
agenda for how they intend to do so.
Governments should undertake 
international comparative studies to 
learn about the differing approaches to 
incentivising giving.
Governments should monitor the effects 
of changes in tax policy and incentives to 
better understand their impact on giving.
Governments should develop a clear 
rationale for how the system of tax 
incentives that is in place delivers their 
agenda for encouraging giving.
INCENTIVISING A PLURALIST CIVIL SOCIETY
Incentives should be justified on the basis that the government recognises the benefits of having a vibrant and diverse civil society, 
irrespective of whether it aligns with policy priorities
Any framework for deciding what causes 
and organisations are eligible for receiving 
donor incentivised gifts needs to reflect 
a formal overriding definition of public 
benefit.
If fairness is a priority then to avoid giving 
a disproportionate benefit to the wealthiest 
in society, we believe that tax credits are 
the most effective system (whether they 
are claimed by the donor or passed on to 
the beneficiary organisation).
Where governments wish to increase 
resources to a particular part of civil society 
they should fund them directly or use 
match funding rather than unbalance the 
tax incentive regime.
The onus of any framework for designating 
eligibility to receive incentivised gifts should 
be on  prohibiting private or closed group 
benefit and stipulating factors that exempt 
such a status in an inclusive, pluralist and 
open system.
Policy makers and advisors should not 
characterise tax incentives as subsidies 
which are offered on the basis that they 
will help to fund activities which would 
otherwise be provided by the state.
All eligible causes should be incentivised 
under exactly the same terms regardless of 
populism or perceived priority  to avoid the 
politicisation of civil society organisations.
8BALANCING FAIRNESS AND PRAGMATISM
Incentives should be designed to elicit the maximum rates of responsiveness whilst prioritising fairness.  
Policy makers should aim for the optimum balance between the two. 
It is legitimate for governments –
particularly in developing nations – to 
cap the amount of incentives that can 
be claimed to avoid unaffordable tax 
expenditure but low threshold caps should 
be avoided.
Caps should be defined as a percentage of 
income rather than a fixed financial value 
so as not to disincentizise the wealthiest 
individual and corporate donors.
High income countries should aim increase 
the percentage of income at which 
donations are taxed, ideally up to 100%.
The basic system of tax incentives should 
be, as far as possible, the same for 
companies and individuals.
In general, nations should not set a 
minimum value of donation or ‘floor’ in 
order for individuals to claim incentives for 
giving. If a system of tax incentives requires 
a floor in order to avoid an excessive 
administrative burden on small gifts then 
the floor should be no lower than the 
median hourly income of a given country.
Where a system of tax deduction is 
preferred, care must be taken to ensure 
that claiming incentives is open to the 
widest possible audience of tax return filers. 
Hybrid systems – which mix deductive 
and credit based incentives – should be 
avoided. 
When incentivised, donations of goods 
and services should be well regulated. A 
valuation by an independent accredited 
source should be required to avoid 
exaggerated claims.
Low tax economies should offer more 
favourable incentives in order to offset 
the relatively lower value that can be 
claimed. Removing caps, floors, offering 
full deduction, or ideally credits at above 
the highest rate of tax could increase 
responsiveness to incentives.
Payroll giving should be legislated for and 
promoted to enable ease of access to 
incentives, particularly in nations where 
there are barriers to claiming incentives for 
those on lower incomes
Where tax expenditure must be limited, 
governments should resort to caps rather 
than limiting eligible causes.
91. Introduction
With 66 per cent of nations offering some form of tax incentive for individual donations (and 77 
per cent offering incentives to companies)1 it is remarkable, and concerning that so little research 
has been undertaken into the comparative structure, political justifications for, and effectiveness 
of incentives regimes for charitable giving between different nations. With discretionary income 
on the rise globally at the same time as an ever increasing need thanks to widening inequality and 
humanitarian crises –  now is the time for a global consensus on what tax incentives are for and how 
they should be implemented to bring about the maximum benefit for all. 
By looking at a sample of 26 nations – detailed notes on each are available in a separate annex – this 
report will look at the way tax incentives regimes are conceived and implemented to ascertain the 
ideal approach to incentivising charitable giving. In identifying an ideal approach it will of course be 
necessary to define the ideal outcome. As an organisation which exists to try and create a sustainable 
resource base on which civil society can flourish globally, CAF believes that tax incentives should be 
judged to some degree on the extent that they elicit greater giving. However, if as is the case for CAF, 
an ideal scenario for civil society is seen as one where everyone is encouraged to give generously to a 
range of causes which is as wide and vibrant as the needs, interests, concerns and aspirations of the 
society it reflects, we must take a holistic approach which looks beyond the value of incentives and 
donor responsiveness.
The study of tax incentives has typically been viewed through the lens of macro-economic realism 
whereby the cost of incentives are weighed up against donor responsiveness and the social goods 
that charitable contributions can buy. However, this report hopes to add the weight of a global 
comparative study to those who have sought to broaden the conception of the role that tax 
incentives for giving play in society. This report will make the case that charitable giving has benefits 
for society which cannot be evaluated against services which might have otherwise been provided 
by the state. We make the case – building on a previous report of the Future World Giving project, 
Enabling an Independent Civil Society2 – that tax incentives policy should be evaluated against its 
efficacy in delivering a vibrant, independent and pluralistic civil society.
This report finds that incentivising charitable giving should not be seen as a means of replacing or 
augmenting the state in its duty to provide services. However, neither does it find the argument that 
charitable giving is not personal consumption and therefore should not be taxed to be sufficiently 
robust a position on which to underpin tax policy. Rather, there is a need to better understand the 
relationship between the government – the body charged with managing fiscal policy – donors and 
CSOs. There is a need to acknowledge that on one hand incentives are a form of tax expenditure, 
or at least forgone tax receipts on the part of the state, but also that incentives to a wide range of 
causes are justified on the grounds that such pluralism in civil society benefits society at large. 
This broadening of measures by which we judge tax incentive policy is timely. Globally, concern is 
building about a trend in which governments are seeking to restrict funding to organisations which 
do not support their agenda. According to the International Center for Not-for-profit Law (ICNL), 
“since 2012 more than ninety laws constraining the freedoms of association or assembly have been 
proposed or enacted.”3 US President Barack has lamented “undue restrictions on civil society and 
fundamental freedoms” and called for “laws, policies, and practices that expand the space for civil 
society to operate in accordance with international law.”4 Such appeals seem, unfortunately, to have 
fallen on deaf ears. 
1  Quick, E. ,Kruise, T. A. ,Pickering, A. (2014) Rules to Give By: A Global Philanthropy Legal Environment Index. Nexus, McDermott, Will & Emery and Charities Aid Foundation 
(CAF). 
2  Pickering, A. (2014) Future World Giving: Enabling an Independent Not-for-profit Sector. Charities Aid Foundation. 
3  Rutzen, D. (2015) Aid Barriers and the Rise of Philanthropic Protectionism, International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 17, no. 1.
4  United States, Office of the President (2014) Presidential Memorandum – Civil Society: Deepening U.S. Government Efforts to Collaborate with and Strengthen Civil Society 
[Online] Washington D.C. Office of the Press Secretary. 
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Tax incentives are often considered an important factor in encouraging philanthropy and therefore 
in creating an enabling environment for civil society. However, this assumption should be seen as 
the corollary to far less widely appreciated reality: that tax incentives can be, and in fact are used to 
marginalise or crowd out certain parts of civil society. In this way, rather than being of niche interest 
to those with an interest in fundraising or fiscal policy, tax incentives policy and the way it is justified 
and implemented should be of interest to anyone wishing to combat the closing space for civil 
society globally. 
The 26 sample nations used in this report span six continents and account for 77 per cent of global 
GDP.5 Our sample includes; Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, China, Egypt, France, 
Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and Vietnam. This diverse set includes 
nations in all four income categories defined by the World Bank6 and allows for comparison between 
the tax treatment of donations in nations with differing systems of government, stages of economic 
development and cultures of charitable giving. In selecting the above nations we have attempted 
to augment the usual suspects in comparative academic study of laws relating to charitable giving 
with nations whose citizens are beginning to enjoy sufficient a discretionary income that they might 
be able to contribute significant resources to CSOs at home and abroad. Indeed, the original scoping 
report of the Future World Giving project, Unlocking the Potential of Global Philanthropy7, calculated 
that according to OECD projections, the world’s middle class population would grow by 165 per cent 
from 2009 to 2030 with 70 per cent of that growth occurring outside of the traditional philanthropic 
centres of Europe and North America.
In making recommendations across such a diverse sample of nations it was necessary to go beyond 
merely assessing the costs to government of incentives for giving and the responsiveness of donors 
to incentives and also consider the appropriateness of incentive regimes for differing contexts. As 
such, this report deals with the varying moral and political justifications for tax incentives, the extent 
to which price elasticity ought to effect their design, the ways in which incentives are structured and 
CSOs gain donor incentivised status, the real comparative value of incentives, the tools used to limit 
tax losses and the myriad barriers to claiming incentives faced by donors. In addition, this report 
deals with a question which lies at the heart of policy making when it concerns tax incentives: what is 
the ideal balance between progressiveness for all and pragmatism from the point of government in 
designing a system of incentives for charitable giving? 
It is hoped that the findings of this report will prompt a wider discussion about tax incentives for 
giving in which ideological positions, entrenched interests and baseless assumptions are challenged. 
Such a discourse may well be essential in securing the future sustainability of civil society.
5  Using 2014 World Bank GDP data we calculate that the 26 sample nations have a GDP of US$60.2 trillion which accounts for 77 per cent of the global total of US$77.8 
trillion – World Bank, GDP at market prices (current US$). [Online].: [Accessed January 2016]
6  World Bank, How are the income group thresholds determined? [Online]. 
7  Pickering, A. (2013) Future World Giving: Unlocking the Potential of Global Philanthropy. Charities Aid Foundation.
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2. Justifying incentives
It is fairly clear that giving is in some way innate to humanity. To differing extents, the charitable 
act has been evident in societies regardless of economic, religious and political context, throughout 
history. But even if giving is ubiquitous, that does not mean it has been immune from criticism. A 
number of philosophers have raised doubts over the moral position of charitable giving. Proponents 
of ethical egoism, such as James Rachels for instance, argue that only a self-interested act can be 
justifiable because we know our own interests better than the interests of others and “if we set out to 
be 'our brother's keeper,' we would often bungle the job and end up doing more mischief than good”.8 
Some rational egoists, such as Ayn Rand, even argue that altruism is actively undesirable because the 
act of prioritising another’s needs above one’s own devalues an individual’s existence in such a way 
that writ large, it could be corrosive for society.9
Whilst such moral opposition to altruism may not represent a mainstream view, it demonstrates that 
it is not sufficient merely to rest on the overwhelming consensus that giving is virtuous and benefits 
society in order to justify incentives. The idea that people might want to, should be allowed to, and 
should even be incentivised to give their money away may not be controversial for most people; but 
a failure to make a compelling moral case for giving could undermine our attempts to assess the 
efficacy of tax incentive regimes designed to promote giving. We cannot hope to know what causes 
should be eligible if we don’t know on what basis they are being awarded. Likewise, we cannot hope 
to judge the fairness of a system if we cannot articulate the moral imperative on what it rests. This 
report finds, in fact, that the design, implementation and ultimately the efficacy of tax incentives 
for charitable giving rest overwhelmingly on the strength and purity of the justifications for their 
existence. 
Charitable giving may pre-date nation states, democracy and even government as a social tool for 
mitigating the natural order in which the strong thrive at the cost of the weak, but that does not 
mean that it should necessarily survive in perpetuity without concession. Even in nations where 
government is very limited, individuals have to cede some degree of personal sovereignty in order 
to enable the state to protect and rule. This social contract has connotations for the freedom of 
the individual to give away their money, as in theory unfettered giving – charitable or otherwise – 
could interfere with the provision of justice and democracy. As the Stanford University philosopher 
and political theorist Rob Reich puts it, “We need only consider debates about estate taxation and 
campaign finance contributions to realize that the state may have good reasons – reasons founded 
on justice – to limit the liberty of people to give money away.”10 The same potential for destabilising 
the social contract that brings about government exists with charitable giving. The capacity for the 
wealthiest individuals and foundations to exert outsize influence in society risks a regression to the 
state of nature where the strong are dominant.  With the wealthy already well-placed to influence 
policy, the importance of ensuring that eligibility for charitable status, and in particular, tax incentives, 
is defined in such a way that enhances the common good is crucial.  
The above pattern of thinking shows that however intrinsic and desirable giving is, it must be 
reconciled with the sovereignty of the state. Inevitably, though, the popular discourse on the 
relationship between the state and charitable giving is distorted by assumptions that have their roots 
in ideology rather than reason. Those with libertarian tendencies might, for example, argue that a 
smaller state leaves greater room for civil society and that with reduced taxes and public services, the 
wealthy will be more inclined to take responsibility for addressing society’s ills upon themselves. In 
reality, there is no strong evidence for this.11 Indeed, if there is a relationship between high taxation 
and giving, then it may well be a positive one. A study plotting the charitable giving of the richest 
8  Rachels. J. (2008) Ethical Egoism. In, Reason & Responsibility: Readings in Some Basic Problems of Philosophy, edited by Feinberg. J and  Shafer-Landau. R, 532–540. 
California: Thomson Wadsworth.
9  Rand, A. (1982) Faith and Force: Destroyers of the Modern World, Philosophy: Who Needs it, New American Library.
10  Reich, R. (2011) Toward a Political Theory of Philanthropy, in, Giving Well: The Ethics of Philanthropy, Illingworth, P. Pogge, T. Wenar, L. eds, Oxford University Press
11  A comparison between data from CAF’s “World Giving Index” and the Heritage Foundation’s “Index of Economic Freedom shows no correlation between the size of the state 
and levels of engagement in charitable giving. Does small government encourage a culture of charitable giving? Future World Giving, Charities Aid Foundation.
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0.01 per cent of Americans against the marginal rate of taxation since 1917 reveals that “a surge in 
contributions [...] from the early 1930s to the late 1960s is correlated with the dramatic increase in 
marginal tax rates for these top income taxpayers to levels as high as 90 per cent in the mid-1940s.”12 
The study also reveals that though the effect is less dramatic, the wealthiest decile increased their 
giving by 0.4 per cent for every 1 per cent increase in taxation.
2.1  Tax Base Rationale
If we accept that government is necessary to guarantee justice and a degree – which varies from one 
nation to another – of social protection, then we must also concede that proponents of charitable 
giving must make concessions where unfettered donations could undermine the social contract. 
By the same token, if we believe (and for the purpose of this report we do) that charitable giving is 
fundamental for resourcing a civil society that counter-balances the state, then we must also accept 
that government should make concessions to avoid crowding out charitable activity. This notion 
forms the basis of the most basic but nevertheless intellectually robust justification for tax incentives 
for giving. Popularised by William Andrews,13 and characterised as the “Tax Base Rationale” by Reich, 
it argues that tax incentives for charitable giving ought not be considered as tax breaks or even 
sacrificed revenue from the state coffers at all, because people should only be taxed on personal 
consumption or wealth accumulation and money given away to charity does not count as either.
The above argument might have an appealing simplicity, but it fails to recognise that the boundary 
between charitable giving and discretionary spending on, for example, consumable goods, is blurry, 
both definitively and from the perspective of the donor/consumer. Furthermore, such a rationale 
designates all giving that is not personal consumption as charitable and takes the power to 
define charitable purposes away from the state completely. This, as Reich points out, has perverse 
connotations. To illustrate this, Reich imagines a millionaire making a tax deductible donation to a 
large multinational profit making company in support of its attempts to disempower trade unions.14 
Clearly, any justification on which tax incentives are offered for charitable giving must recognise the 
need to protect collective rights and afford the role of arbitrator of eligibility to the apparatus of the 
state, if not the government. 
2.2 Subsidy Rationale
The second, and by far the most popular justification for tax incentives for charitable giving identified 
by Reich responds to this need to guarantee that the giving of the individual does not come at the 
cost of the state. The “Subsidy Rationale” justifies incentives on the grounds that “the state provides 
incentives for charity because it is believed that the incentives stimulate the production of something 
of greater social value than what the state could have produced on its own, had it not offered the 
incentives.”15 
As popular as this justification is with fundraisers and lawmakers alike, it is deeply flawed. Whereas 
the Tax Base Rationale puts too much onus on individual freedom the Subsidy Rationale prioritises 
the state to such an extent that charitable giving is seen as worthy of being encouraged only when it 
augments, replaces or compliments the activities of the state.  As Reich notes, “what’s obvious about 
the subsidy rationale is that it shifts attention from the fair treatment of the donor to the recipient of 
the donation and the good that is done with the gift.”16 Such a justification  may recognise the social 
goods resulting from a CSOs work that are also valued by the State, but the diversity of their missions 
and operations means that they may well be  achieving a far greater social value that doesn’t 
necessarily lead to recognition by the state. Hence, according to the Subsidy Rationale, activities that 
have benefited society but are not closely aligned to the activities of the state, such as human rights 
12  Fack, G. & Landais, C. (2012) Charitable Giving and Tax Policy: A Historical and Comparative Perspective Paris School of Economics, CEPR / CEPREMAP
13  Andrews, W. (1972) Personal Deduction in an Ideal Income Tax. Harvard Law Review 86
14  Reich, R. (2011) Toward a Political Theory of Philanthropy
15  Ibid.
16  Ibid.
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advocacy, are not deserving of receiving tax incentives. As we will see throughout this publication, 
the popularity of The Subsidy Rationale has, and continues to have, a strongly negative effect on the 
development of tax incentives regimes around the world. 
2.3  Pluralism Rationale
Both the Tax Base Rationale and the Subsidy Rationale make strong cases for the existence of tax 
incentives, but also contain ideas which could lead to unintended negative consequences for the 
development of a culture of giving. Whilst the former fails to recognise any legitimate role for the 
state in restricting − or even taxing − a transaction that an individual subjectively deems to be 
charitable, the latter could be used by the state to justify incentivising only donations which directly 
reinforce the narrow interests of the state. 
Such justifications can be seen through the lens of Isiah Berlin’s “Two Concepts of Liberty” as resting 
on the desire for different kinds of freedom. The Tax Base Rationale prioritises freedom from external 
interference (negative liberty) and the Subsidy Rationale prioritises protecting people from inhibitions 
of the social structure in carrying out their free will (positive liberty). Berlin may have rejected the 
Tax Base Rationale as we have, on the grounds that the unfettered freedom it affords the wealthy to 
pursue their own interests at a cost to state coffers is outweighed by the impact this may have on the 
agency of others: “Men are largely interdependent,” he wrote, “and no man's activity is so completely 
private as never to obstruct the lives of others in any way. 'Freedom for the pike is death for the 
minnows'; the liberty of some must depend on the restraint of others. Freedom for an Oxford don, 
others have been known to add, is a very different thing from freedom for an Egyptian peasant."17
But whilst Berlin recognised the importance of positive liberty, he expressed grave fears that 
governments could use the guaranteeing of positive liberties to exert stifling control over individuals 
and groups with ideas, opinions and values that deviate from what is judged to be in their own, and 
society’s, best interests. This of course, is an inherent danger in using the Subsidy Rationale to justify 
tax incentives for charitable giving because it hands to the state the ability to determine which 
causes are charitable; or put another way, what is (whether we know it or not) actually in our best 
interests. Berlin’s solution is to recommend a balance between his two concepts of liberty, in which the 
agency of individuals and groups are protected but a pluralism in values is also maintained through 
state restraint: 
“Pluralism, with the measure of 'negative' liberty that it entails, seems to me a truer and 
more humane ideal than the goals of those who seek in the great disciplined, authoritarian 
structures the ideal of 'positive' self-mastery by classes, or peoples, or the whole of mankind. It 
is truer, because it does, at least, recognise the fact that human goals are many, not all of them 
commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with one another. To assume that all values can be 
graded on one scale, so that it is a mere matter of inspection to determine the highest, seems 
to me to falsify our knowledge that men are free agents, to represent moral decision as an 
operation which a slide-rule could, in principle, perform.”
Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, 195818
In line with the conclusions of Berlin, Reich offers what he calls a “Pluralism Rationale” which balances 
the need to advance the agency of the individual through incentives for donations to a diverse range 
of causes, whilst also acknowledging the need for, and legitimacy of some state imposed boundaries 
on what might be considered eligible charitable purposes. 
17  Berlin, I. (1958) Two Concepts of Liberty.  In: Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty. (1969) Oxford: Oxford University Press.
18   Ibid.
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However, a pluralist approach to justifying tax incentives – and the prominent and active role of CSOs 
in society generally – is more difficult to articulate than the more intuitively logical Subsidy Rationale. 
Politicians and civil servants will perhaps naturally favour incentives which they perceive to deliver 
a fair return on the public’s investment.  They might argue, quite persuasively, that in a democracy 
the government has a mandate to use tax revenues to deliver the agenda for which they have been 
elected. By extension, the notion that the government ought to be compelled to offer tax incentives 
to charities which are working to undermine their vision is necessarily undemocratic. 
The above complaint rests on the false assumption that an increase in funding to critical CSOs 
equates to a transfer of power from governments, and in the case of democracy, citizens. The 
flaw in this logic is the notion that the relationship between both parties is necessarily a zero-sum 
game.19In reality, civil society plays a crucial role in counter-balancing the tendency for the state to 
justify limitations on the liberty of groups that may be under-represented or disempowered through 
what John Adams termed as the tyranny of the majority.20 Visiting the United States of America 
in 1835, Alexis de Tocqueville feared that democratic government offered few guarantees that a 
marginal majority could not impose its slight preference against the dire needs of a slight minority;
“No one will assert that a people cannot forcibly wrong another people; but parties may 
be looked upon as lesser nations within a greater one, and they are aliens to each other: if, 
therefore, it be admitted that a nation can act tyrannically towards another nation, it cannot be 
denied that a party may do the same towards another party.”
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 183521
The need to balance positive and negative liberties against one another is especially crucial in 
the relationship between the state and civil society.  In essence, it is by fulfilling this need that 
the Pluralism Rationale justifies tax incentives for charitable gifts. So for Reich, “the benefit being 
produced is civil society itself, not the catalogue of public goods or benefits produced by the roster of 
organizations that constitute civil society”.
Ultimately, governments are beholden to the majority in an electorate (and to the funders of 
political candidates and parties to differing extents) but the interests of the state are served by 
the strengthening of institutions, the rule of law and civic engagement. Charitable giving is the 
cornerstone of a civil society that allows critical views to be communicated constructively. Those views 
may be uncomfortable and sometimes even disruptive for government, but stifling them will corrode 
the very social contract on which government rests. When leaders fail to see civil society in this light, 
as has been the case in Egypt,22 they are liable to find that their desire to stifle civil society has the 
effect of creating more, rather than less social unrest. Incentivising charitable giving under broad, 
pluralistic definitions of what constitutes public benefit can act as a pressure gauge that regulates 
the myriad passions and furies of society and releases it in such a way that it can be a reliable and 
powerful source for good.  
This report finds the Pluralism Rationale to be the most compelling, and sustainable justification for 
tax incentives for charitable giving. However, as we will see in subsequent chapters, it appears to be 
far less prominent in the thinking of governments when it comes to developing incentives regimes for 
giving and as a result, many governments have adopted self-serving policies which view incentives as 
a subsidy for extending the agenda of the government.
19  Sending, O. J. and Neuman, I. B. (2008) Governance to Governmentality: Analyzing NGOs, States and Power.  International Studies Quarterly, 50,651-672.
20  Adams, J. (1788) A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America. Vol. 3. London
21  Tocqueville, A. and Bender, T. (1981) Democracy in America. New York: Modern Library.
22  Pickering, A. (2014) By trying to control civil society, the Egyptian government could fuel more social unrest. New Statesman. [Online]. 
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3. Assessing the efficacy of incentives
Clearly, in order to warrant this study into the strengths and weaknesses of different tax incentive 
regimes for charitable giving around the world, it is necessary to assume that tax incentives for giving 
are worthwhile. However, that does not automatically mean that they are the most effective way of 
motivating donors. 
Match funding, for example has been offered as a potentially highly effective way of motivating 
increased donations. One study found that the offer of a match “increases both the revenue per 
solicitation and the probability that an individual donates” with overall funds donated increasing by 
19 per cent.23 Indeed, the fields of behavioural economics and psychology have produced a litany 
of experimental evidence which suggests that utilising “social norms”  and “nudging” behaviour 
with subtle and inexpensive changes to the way that we communicate and place messages in our 
environment can be as, or more effective than financial incentives. For example, in one experiment, 
donations into charity collection buckets in supermarkets increased by 48 per cent when a poster of 
an eye was introduced into the environment compared to the control, which was a poster of stars.24 
As discussed in section 1, we do not find judging the success or importance of tax incentives for 
charitable giving to be as simple as simply assessing the extent to which they increase donations. 
The ethical and philosophical justifications for tax incentives, as well as the effect they have on the 
perceptions of the public, the state and civil society itself on their respective relationship is also part of 
the consideration. Having said that, it is clearly important to understand to what extent tax incentives 
are effective as a motivator of charitable giving, not least because, contrary to our misgivings, most 
policy makers see strong price elasticity in the response to incentives as an important factor.25
Unless we accept entirely that tax incentives for charitable giving are already wholly justified – either 
because they promote a plural civil society or because such gifts should not be considered part of a 
person’s taxable income – we must also consider the degree to which these incentives are efficient. 
If incentives are to be justified, to any extent, on the basis that they result in increased giving, then 
we must prove the counterfactual claim (i.e. that people would have given the same amount in the 
absence of the incentive) to be false. Even for proponents of the pluralism rationale, this question 
might be relevant in deciding whether there ought to be caps on the incentives that can be claimed. 
Boris Bittker defines the need to prove elasticity particularly well:
“In the indictment of tax deductions for charitable contributions, the charge is that they 
are inefficient because such a large fraction of charitable gifts would be forthcoming in any 
event that the incremental contributions stimulated by the deduction are too small to justify 
their cost.”26
Boris Bittker, The Propriety and Vitality of a Federal Income Tax Deduction for Private 
Philanthropy, 1972
This alleged inelasticity, where donors are sufficiently committed to giving that they continue to do 
so even as the cost rises (as incentives are removed for example) is taken by some to be a challenge 
that must be answered in order to justify tax incentives on the grounds that they are cost efficient. 
This effectively means “that a policy of increased tax deductibility can [only] be efficient if a drop in 
the tax cost (i.e., the cost of the donation) results in a disproportionate increase in donations”27 or, put 
23 Karlan, D. and List, J. A. (2006) Does price matter in charitable giving? Evidence form a large scale natural field experiment. Woking Paper 12338, National Bureau of 
Economic Research.
24 Powell, K. L., Roberts, G., Nettle, D. & Fusani, l. (2012) Eye images increase charitable donations: evidence from an opportunistic field experiment in a supermarket. Ethology, 
118:1096.
25 Price elasticity in this document refers to the price elasticity of demand. It is a commonly used measure in economics to assess the responsiveness, or elasticity, in the demand 
for a given good or service in relation to its price. In the case of tax incentives for giving the “good or service” is charitable giving. Given that the cost of giving increases when 
the value of tax incentives decreases it is possible to look at tax incentives on the basis of “price”. The market is said to be responsive, or elastic, when demand increases as a 
result of a fall in price. In practice, a study of price elasticity in demand gives the percentage change in quantity demanded in response to a one percent change in price. A 
negative value would indicate price elastic behaviour
26  Bittker, B. J. (1972) The Propriety and Vitality of a Federal Income Tax Deduction for Private Philanthropy. In: Tax Impacts of Philanthropy. Aaron, A. ed. Princeton  NJ: Tax  
Institute of America, 145-59.
27  Peloza, J. & Steel, P. (2006) The Price Elasticity of Charitable Contributions: A Meta Analysis. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing. Vol. 24, No. 2 pp 260-373.
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another way, charitable giving can be shown to be price elastic.  
Clearly, attempts to measure the effect of incentives offered through the tax system suffer from the 
lack of a controlled environment in which the response to an incentive could be measured against 
a counterfactual environment in which the incentive had not been offered. For the most part, we 
are forced instead to rely on experimental research. For example, a 2002 experiment issued tokens 
to subjects and instructed them that they could either keep them or give them to others. The value 
of the tokens fluctuated when they were transferred, mimicking the ‘cost’ of giving which may be 
positive or negative. The authors concluded that people are less inclined to give when the cost of 
doing so increases, providing evidence that people are innately responsive to tax incentives when 
making donations.28
The closest that we can realistically get to the ideal test scenario (of a randomised, controlled trial of 
incentives) is to take advantage of changes in tax policy and review the resulting change in giving 
habits. By looking at the charitable contributions of people, particularly over longer time periods 
whereby the relative cost of giving (i.e. changes in income tax) rises and falls, researchers have 
attempted to establish the price elasticity of charitable giving. Such a wealth of these studies have 
taken place in the United States, that it was possible for John Peloza and Piers Steel to produce a 
meta-analysis of 138 studies comprising a combined sample size of over 1.4 million people. The 
study found that after removing outliers of more than three standard deviations from the mean, the 
weighted price elasticity for charitable giving (in the United States at least) was -1.11. This effectively 
means that an extra 1 per cent in the value of incentives offered (or a 1 per cent cheapening of 
the donation) would result in an increase in donation size of 1.11 per cent; allowing us a clear, if 
somewhat marginal case for tax incentives being treasury efficient. However, if the sole argument for 
incentives for charitable giving is they “enable the government to justify the transfer of responsibility 
for the provision of some public services to charities and nonprofit groups”, then such a marginal 
return may not be sufficient.29 As stated above, this report suggests that the pursuit of a diverse and 
independent civil society is the most viable justification for incentives for charitable giving. It would 
seem that even those who prefer a Subsidy Rationale that rests on the elasticity of charitable giving 
would need to bolster their position by supplementing it with elements of the Pluralism Rationale. 
Unfortunately, there is a lack of comparable studies from other nations to enable a global comparison 
of the price elasticity of charitable contributions in relation to incentives. It may be that cultural 
differences, traditions, religion or any other significant socio-economic or demographic variable have 
the effect of amplifying or muting a people’s response to incentives. Indeed, the legal and regulatory 
environment in which CSOs operate can have a determinate impact on the perceived trustworthiness 
and independence of CSOs. As such, these themes were explored in the Future World Giving project 
in Building Trust in Charitable Giving and Enabling an Independent Not-for-profit Sector. However, 
with this in mind, and with the caveat that any association could not be said to be a correlation, it is 
possible to observe a relationship between the number of people who regularly make donations in 
nations which have some form of tax incentive for charitable giving, and those which have none  
at all. 
The Rules to Give By Index30, produced by Nexus, McDermott, Will & Emery and CAF, analysed the 
basic legal infrastructure for charitable giving in all 193 United Nations-recognised nations. As 
part of this, the report used data from the 2013 World Giving Index31 to see whether those nations 
which offered incentives to donors saw a higher proportion of people making donations to CSOs in 
28  Andreoni, J. and J, Miller. (2002), Giving according to GARP: an experimental test of the consistency of preferences for altruism. Econometrica 70(2): 737–53
29  Peloza, J. & Steel, P. (2006) The Price Elasticity of Charitable Contributions: A Meta Analysis. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing. Vol. 24, No. 2 pp 260-373.
30  Quick, E. Kruise, T. A, Pickering, A. (2014) Rules to Give By: A Global Philanthropy Legal Environment Index. Nexus, McDermott, Will & Emery and Charities Aid Foundation 
(CAF).
31  Charities Aid Foundation. (2013) World Giving Index 2013.
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the month before being survey. The report found that the proportion of people donating money to 
charity is 12 percentage points higher in nations which offer some form of tax incentive to individuals 
(33 per cent) than those that offer no incentives (21 per cent). Furthermore, it found that a similar 
effect could be seen across nations of differing levels of economic development with Low Income 
nations (as defined by the World Bank) actually seeing the largest difference in the proportion of 
people making monthly donations between countries offering incentives (27 per cent) and those 
offering none (18 per cent). 
This apparent relationship offers another potential way of judging the efficacy of tax incentives for 
charitable giving: perhaps their presence alone is sufficient, because the existence of tax incentives 
indicates a legal environment which is inherently enabling, regardless of whether or not incentives are 
actually claimed by donors (and bearing in mind that in many nations incentives are not offered to 
those who don’t itemize their tax returns). Though the above evidence may not suggest causation (it 
may well be a sign that tax incentives are most likely to be available in nations where a strong culture 
of giving creates a demand for incentives), it suggests that tax incentives are part of a wider package 
of policies which create an enabling environment for civil society to develop.  
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4. Eligibility of beneficiary organisations
The means by which governments shape the law and judiciaries interpret it to bestow or deny  
donor-incentivised status to CSOs will not only skew the flow of donations to certain causes but may 
also come to define what causes are seen as charitable. Even the most pluralistic justification for 
offering tax incentives to donors must define what causes are, and are not, worthy of such exceptional 
treatment. If we consider the value provided to society by CSOs to be special then a list of causes, 
characteristics and activities that defines them is a necessary corollary. This creates a troubling 
paradox for policy makers as on the one hand, at its essence civil society is an unchecked public sphere 
where independent voices can coalesce around shared interests32, and on the other hand, CSOs as 
organisational embodiments of civil society must have legal status in order to gain tax exempt and 
donor incentivised status. As such, the means by which governments confer tax privileges – to some 
causes and deny them to others – is as philosophically fraught as it is necessary. 
4.1  Patchwork vs Staircase systems
Within our sample of 26 nations we have identified two broad structures for offering donor-incentivised 
status to CSOs:
  Patchwork System: Incentives are offered, offered at a higher rate, or with higher caps for 
certain recognised purposes. 
  Staircase System: Incentives are offered, offered at a higher rate, or with higher caps as 
organisations register, or pass through additional tiers of registration limited to certain 
charitable purposes.
Most nations use a combination of both approaches to incentivise some causes over others. Italy, for 
example, offers a range of tax credits and incentives which differ from one cause and/or organisation 
type to another. However, over and above this Patchwork System of incentives, some organisations 
can apply to register as ONLUS (Organizzazioni non lucrative di utilità sociale) enabling donors to 
receive a higher, flat tax credit. However, some nations lean heavily towards a patchwork system in 
which incentives are offered to donors only when giving to specific causes; and in some cases only 
when giving to specific CSOs. In the case of Bangladesh, for instance, deductions are available only 
on donations to a narrow list of causes including charitable hospitals, national level institutions set 
up in memory of the liberation war and gifts in memory of the “Father of the Nation, as well as to a 
cultural development institution established in Bangladesh by the Aga Khan Development Network”. 
Though Turkey appears to have a relatively straight foreword one step system, this represents an 
extreme high-pass filter in which the number of organisations that have successfully applied for and 
received public benefit status from the Council of Ministers is very low. Only five per cent of foundations 
and only 0.04 per cent of associations have actually achieved the public benefit status required to 
enable donor incentivised gifts.
If this study is reflective of the global environment, most nations which allow tax breaks to donors 
can be said to be using a stepped system to some extent; in that CSOs must gain some form of legal 
status, accreditation or successfully register with regulators in order to receive tax gifts that reduce 
the tax liability of donors. However, some nations have multiple “steps”. In Australia, for example, 
there are approximately 600,000 non-profit organisations, of which almost 60,000 are registered with 
the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission as “charities”, allowing them to receive tax 
concessions and be eligible to receive public funds. In order to allow donors to claim tax incentives for 
donations, charities must apply for Deductible Gift Recipient (DGR) status. At present, approximately 
28,000 organisations have DGR status.33 
32  Habermas, J. (1962) The  Structural Transformation of the  Public  Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Translated by Thomas Burger, 1989. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press.
33  McLeod, J. (2013) The PAF Report – Private Ancillary Funds After 12 Years.  JBWere 
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4.2 Inclusive versus exclusive frameworks for designating eligibility
Of the twenty-six countries in our study, we judge 12 of them to have an inclusive approach to 
tax incentives that offers donors the freedom to donate to their chosen cause based on a broad 
definition of public benefit. This is not an easy distinction to make. In one sense, definitions of what 
causes are charitable or considered to be of “public benefit” will inevitably exclude certain purposes. 
However, a distinction can be made between those nations that offer tax incentives on the basis of 
what the public might broadly agree on as constituting legitimate causes, and those nations that 
offer incentives to causes that are either non-political – and hence exclude issues such as human 
rights or the environment – or align closely with the government’s own agenda.
In general, we have noted that nations that have inclusive and exclusive frameworks for accrediting 
CSOs to receive incentivised gifts tend to have certain distinct features and approaches:
  Inclusive: A broad legal definition of public benefit underpins eligibility to receive tax-efficient 
gifts. CSOs tend to be accredited to receive incentivised gifts through a one-step system.
  Exclusive: Criteria for eligibility are highly specific to certain narrow causes and may be 
subject to political/executive discretion. CSOs tend to be accredited to receive incentivised 
gifts by registering under a patchwork system of different causes and programmes or through 
a complex stepped system that has multiple tiers, rates of incentives and caps for different 
causes. 
Nations that could be said to have inclusive frameworks generally have a legal definition of public 
benefit and specify broad areas under which certain purposes are considered to be in the public good. 
Under such a framework, the advancement of a broad range of causes can be considered charitable 
(the “benefit” part of public benefit) providing that they do not contravene the law and benefit the 
public in general, or a sufficient section of the public (the “public” part of public benefit), and do not 
give rise to more than incidental personal benefit for those running the organisation or donating to it. 
Where organisations are able to register under these conditions in order to enable donors to donate 
and claim tax deductions or credits, this could be considered to be an inclusive system. 
The twelve countries in our report that could be said to have  inclusive systems that offer tax 
incentives include, to differing degrees, Canada, Ireland, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Philippines, 
Poland, Russia, Singapore, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and  the United States of America. Whilst it is 
impossible to prove causation, it may be significant that according to the World Giving Index 201534 
(excluding Turkey for which no data is available) the average proportion of the population reporting 
having given money to charity in the past month was almost double (44 per cent) that of those 
which could be said to have exclusive systems (24 per cent). 
Nations which have what we have termed exclusive eligibility criteria for donor incentivised gifts to 
CSOs include Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Egypt, France, India, Italy, South Africa 
and Vietnam. In some instances, we have judged eligibility to be exclusive due to the fact that a 
prominent feature of the incentive regime is that some causes are subject to higher incentives than 
others. Whilst some states within the USA offer additional incentives on top of federal ones for 
certain local priorities, we do not on balance consider this to be a prominent feature of the system as 
a whole. A counter example would be a nation like France, which allows a 75 per cent tax credit to be 
offered – up to a cap at 20 per cent of income – for donations in support of certain causes, such as 
school meal provision, whilst for other causes the incentive drops to a 66 per cent tax credit above a 
€521 threshold.
34  Charities Aid Foundation. (2015) World Giving Index 2015
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Other countries have more forcefully exclusive eligibility requirements which exclude most causes 
from donor-incentivised fundraising completely to the benefit of a narrow group of highly selective 
causes. In Brazil for example, the federal government offers incentives under the following themes; 
children and adolescents, sports, culture, audiovisual, elderly, handicapped and cancer; and even 
then only to organisations that have a specific project previously approved by the Government. 
Furthermore, even within this narrow list of causes, organizations eligible under the theme of 
“handicapped” and “cancer” are subject to lower caps (2 per cent instead of 6 per cent of taxable 
income). State level incentives are offered under a specific theme, São Paulo’s Municipality regulates 
tax incentives related to culture for example. Given the paucity of incentives at federal level this is 
seen as a key feature of the incentive eligibility system in Brazil.
4.3 Political/executive discretion in eligibility by charitable purpose
We have already dealt with the question of how tax incentives for donors can be justified in the first 
part of this report, and made the case for governments to be the convenors and the judiciary to be 
the arbiters of the process. But if we assume that incentives are desirable, we also have to concede 
that it puts a great deal of responsibility in the hands of government to shape the eligibility of CSOs 
to receive incentivised gifts. It goes without saying that even under the most liberal interpretation 
of what causes should be eligible; a process must also be in place for deciding when an organisation 
or cause is not eligible. The extent to which that process is reflective of the broader public interest 
and a commitment to a vibrant and diverse civil society, or merely a desire to further the ruling 
government’s agenda, may well be as important for the development of a culture of giving as the 
value of incentives. Indeed, where incentives are perceived to be politically distributed, the resulting 
cynicism may be worse than having no incentives at all. 
The world has seen a worrying closing of civic space, which threatens the very independence of civil 
society. CAF has detailed at length the grave importance of this issue in “Enabling an Independent 
Not-for-profit Sector”,35 highlighting the fact that it could undermine efforts to get a new generation 
of upwardly-mobile citizens in transitional economies to engage in philanthropy. Despite the 
potential for emerging domestic cultures of giving to drive sustainable development, governments 
are increasingly seeking to limit eligible causes to those which are uncritical of the state and its 
agenda. “Dozens of countries that had previously allowed or even welcomed democracy and rights 
support activities inside their borders are now working to stop it.”36
This trend is not merely a tangential issue in the discussions of tax incentives for giving: when both 
the range of causes to which donors can give and their perception of having free will in making a 
donation is eroded, even the most generous incentives will not persuade them to part with their 
money. In our view, insofar as is achievable, incentives should strive to be cause neutral within the 
confines of broad public benefit definitions. Clearly, there is a democratic argument that governments 
elected by citizens should be able to make policy adjustments that bring the range of causes to which 
donors can give tax effectively into line with consensus politics. However, that debate should be a 
highly inclusive and deliberative one; with decisions being taken after hard-fought agreement. 
35  Pickering, A. (2014) Future World Giving: Enabling an Independent Not-for-profit Sector. Charities Aid Foundation.
36  Carothers, T & Brechenmacher, S. (2014) Closing Space: Democracy and Human Rights Support Under Fire Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
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  Figure 1   Range of public benefit purposes for which tax incentives can be claimed on donations 
for individuals and companies
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4.3.1  Limiting of legal purposes
In some nations covered for this report, the cause areas in which the government would inevitably 
come in for criticism from civil society groups are simply excluded from incentives completely. In 
Vietnam for example, causes under which organisations can claim donor-incentivised gifts are limited 
to: institutions or establishments raising or caring for children in difficult situations, disabled people, 
elderly feeble people, charitable, humanitarian or study promotional funds. Clearly, this precludes more 
obviously challenging areas such as human rights and environmental protection. Similarly, although 
tax incentives are available for corporations in Saudi Arabia (individuals do not pay income tax), the 
permissible causes for “charitable societies” and “charitable foundations” are limited to: helping the 
poor, improving residences, providing financial aid to needy people; youth employment activities; and 
providing healthcare, educational and social services. This means that there is little room for funding − 
let alone incentivising − certain causes.
4.3.2  Executive influence in assigning tax incentivised status
Some incentive regimes appear to allow the government considerable discretion in awarding 
organisations which fit their political agenda with the ability to receive donor-incentivised gifts. 
For example, the system under which incentives are offered in Brazil is extremely complicated; and 
this complexity offers ample opportunity for incentives to be moulded around a political agenda. 
Federal tax incentives for individuals are restricted to donations to organisations delivering specific 
government-approved projects in the fields of: child and adolescents sports, culture, audiovisual, elderly, 
handicapped, and cancer. Tax incentives for corporations are less restricted. Corporations can also 
claim incentives when giving to specific government-approved projects related to those causes but 
are also able to claim incentives when giving to a wider range of organisations. State and Municipal 
tax incentives are also liable to be used to promote politically-favourable CSOs. States and cities are 
able to set their own priorities – São Paulo, for instance, offers incentives for cultural organisations – 
though even within this narrow cause a complex and bureaucratic application process for organisations 
seeking to gain donor-incentivised status creates the potential for local politicians to reward only their 
favoured organisations, or at least the perception that they do. Added to this perception that the 
system for offering incentives to donors is prone to political interference, the spectre of corruption and 
cronyism has dogged Brazilian civil society; with scandals often relating to the rewarding of status 
to organisations affiliated to government ministers. A notorious example relates to a 2009 covenant 
agreed between the Ministry of Tourism and the Brazilian Institute of Development for Sustainable 
Infrastructure (IBRASI) – a CSO – for capacity building in the promotion of tourism in the state of 
Amapá. The CSO received government money which it then sub-contracted to fake companies allowing 
associates of government officials to embezzle in excess of R$15 million (US$3,7 million).37 
In other nations, either intentionally or through poor policy implementation, there are tax incentives 
which although somewhat progressive on paper, are rarely easily or widely available in practice. In 
China, for example, the Public Welfare Donations Law details a relatively wide range of purposes 
under which incentives can be claimed, including: disaster relief, poverty alleviation, assistance to 
the handicapped, education, scientific, cultural, public health, athletic undertakings, environmental 
protection and construction of public facilities, and social development and progress. However, in 
practice, the requirement to gain official status as a “public benefit social organization” − an unclear 
process that few organisations appear to have successfully navigated − rules most CSOs out of 
receiving donor-incentivised gifts.  Despite the roll-out of relatively generous tax incentives in China (30 
per cent deduction of taxable income) rates of giving remain low – just 13 per cent of Chinese people 
reported giving money to a CSO in the previous month to being surveyed for the World Giving Index 
in 2013, seeing it place 107th out of 135 nations on that measure. This continuing lack of donations 
to CSOs despite the availability of incentives is partly reflective of poor policy implementation; with 
tax officials remaining unaware of the incentives on offer. Low levels of giving are also, according to 
37  de Sainte Croix, Sarah. (2011) Ministry of Tourism Scandal Erupts in Brazil. [Online] The Rio Times. 
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the Council on Foundations, “a reflection of the lack of clear, simple and well-publicized tax exemption 
regulations and procedures for individual donors”.38 
The notion that the Chinese state might be using tax incentives to guide the development of civil 
society away from more disruptive activities by rewarding only a select few independent organisations 
as well as Government Organised NGOs (GONGOs) is given credence by a 2013 document leaked to the 
press. Document Nine as it has become known, was submitted to the Third Plenum of the Eighteenth 
Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and lists as one of its “seven perils” for the next decade 
of Communist government, “Promoting civil society in an attempt to dismantle the ruling party’s 
social foundation”.  This rare and transparent example of a government articulating its motivations 
for suppressing civil society states that; “civil society has been adopted by Western anti-China forces 
and used as a political tool” and that “their [CSOs’] advocacy is becoming a serious form of political 
opposition.” 
Much like China, Turkey offers tax incentives to donors who make contributions to CSOs that deliver 
against one of the following public benefit purposes; Health, social aid, education, scientific research 
and development, culture and environmental protection. However, in order to receive incentivised gifts, 
CSOs must apply to the Council of Ministers for public benefit status (associations) and foundations 
must apply for tax exempt status (foundations). Currently the number of organisations that have 
successfully applied for and received public benefit status/tax exempt status from the Council of 
Ministers is very low. Only 5 per cent of foundations have tax exempt status, and only 0.04 per cent of 
associations have the public benefit status.39  
4.3.3  Differing incentive values for charitable purposes
Even if we accept the suggestion made already in this report − that public benefit should be defined 
on broader criteria than simply matching the government’s own agenda, or trying to emulate populist 
sentiment − there remains a question as to whether some causes ought to receive greater incentives 
than others. 
As was outlined earlier in this chapter, it is the opinion of this report that incentives should be offered on 
the basis of a single-stepped ‘staircase system’ where registration in an ‘inclusive framework’ of broad 
public benefit purpose definitions entitles a CSO to receive donor incentivised contributions. The logical 
extension of this position is that donors should receive the same incentives when giving to all registered 
CSOs. However, in some nations included in this study, different incentives are offered to organisations 
that have particular charitable causes. 
In India, for instance, donors who give to CSOs that gain registration under Income Tax Act Section 
80G are generally able to deduct 50 per cent of the value of the donation against their taxable 
income. However, there are a number of causes which enable the donor to claim larger deductions. 
For example, donations to government-operated charities under 80G (more on what this means in 
the next sub-section) qualify for a 100 per cent deduction. In addition to the above, Section 35AC of 
The Income Tax Act allows donors to deduct the full value of their donations (subject to caps) against 
taxable income when making contributions to certain priorities; such as drinking water projects, home 
building for the poor, and school building in poor areas. Section 35CCB of the Act also allows 100 per 
cent deductions on donations to associations and institutions carrying out programs of conservation 
of natural resources. In addition, Section 35(1)(iii) of the Act allows deductions of 125 per cent or 
175 per cent for donations to certain research and science endeavours. In addition to these enhanced 
incentives, which can apply to certain CSOs as well as organisations in other sectors, deductions against 
38 Council on Foundations. China, Country Notes. [Online]
39 Balkan Civil Society Development Network. (2014) Monitoring Enabling Environment for Civil Society Development: the civil society environment in Turkey 2014 report. 
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total taxable income are capped at differing rates (ten or 100 per cent) depending on the charitable 
purpose for which the contributions are made.
In France, individuals are able to claim a 75 per cent credit against tax liability on donations totalling 
up to €521. Incentives above the €521 threshold are calculated at 66 per cent of the donation 
but limited at 20 per cent of total taxable income. However, donations to certain causes (such as 
supplying free meals for persons in difficult situations) can retain a 75 per cent credit on tax liability 
above the €521 threshold. In Italy, there is a range of legal forms under which donations qualify for 
different incentives. Donors to organisations with ONLUS status – for which CSOs can apply under 
a relatively wide range of purposes – are eligible to receive tax credits of 26 per cent of the value of 
their donations against taxable income (subject to caps). However, donors to non-profit foundations 
and associations with exclusive interest in performing arts and Social Promotional Associations 
receive only a 19 per cent credit. Donations to “Non Governative Organisations”, Universities, 
public and private research entities, national parks/resources and environmental protection are fully 
tax-deductible. On top of this complicated set of credits and deductions for different legal forms, 
incentives are capped – in some cases by value and in other cases as a percentage of taxable income 
– at different levels based on either purpose or organisational form. The Turkish state raises the cap 
on deductions from 10 per cent of taxable income to 100 per cent for certain charitable purposes 
such as foundations and associations running food banks. 
This study recommends avoiding the use of different values of charitable tax incentive for different 
causes and organisational types where possible, and finds in favour of a single rate of incentive. 
There are a number of reasons that incentivising one cause or organisation type above others could 
be problematic. For one thing, it may well act as a disincentive for donors to give to causes that 
attract lower rates of tax relief, as donations to these causes become comparatively more costly and 
thus may seem less appealing. However, differential rates of relief may also pose problems for the 
organisations receiving the highest incentives. This may seem counterintuitive, but we must consider 
that when a certain charity receives preferential donor-incentivised status, this frames their request 
for donations in the eyes of the donor. And when the government offers higher incentives for a 
certain cause, there is a danger that it will be perceived as being offered on the basis that it is closely 
aligned with the government’s agenda. Charitable giving is an expression of independent agency, so 
any sense that a gift is being made to support the activities of the state may undermine the belief 
that a donation to that cause is a transaction which takes place wholly within the civil society space. 
Interestingly, behavioural economics suggests others ways in which higher incentives for a given 
cause might actually have unintended, and even counter-productive consequences. When offering 
higher rates of incentives for a particular cause or organisation type, governments should consider 
the crowding out effect of such incentives through the erosion of the positive image motivation 
for making a donation.40 When giving to charity, donors want to be perceived to be supporting an 
organisation out of pure altruism, in as far as that is possible. However, by giving to a cause that 
allows them to claim the highest incentives, a donor may worry that they will be perceived by their 
peers to have prioritised their charitable activity on the basis of those incentives. Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, such an approach makes understanding the effect that incentives have on giving – 
a difficult enough task in the simplest of scenarios – almost impossible. 
4.3.4 Incentives for alignment with government agenda
At face value, it may seem fiscally responsible to incentivise those who wish to augment their tax 
liabilities by making further contributions to state-directed enterprise. Indeed, there may well be 
circumstances where the agenda of the government and the priorities of donors are so closely 
40  Leicester, A., Levell, P. & Rasul, I. “Tax and Benefit Policy: Insights From Behavioural Economics”, IFS Commentary C125, Institute of Fiscal Studies (2012)  
SBN: 978-1-903274-91-0
25
aligned that any additional subsidy provided by the state would be eminently justifiable. The clearest 
examples of this come in the form of humanitarian aid appeals. However, the method by which 
government chooses to incentivise giving which fits its own agenda is important. For example, 
compare the Turkish government’s lifting of the 10 per cent cap on the deduction against taxable 
income for donations through the Prime Ministry for disaster relief and for gifts to the Turkish Red 
Crescent with the recent (2015) Nepal earthquake appeal in the United Kingdom by the Disaster 
Emergency Committee (DEC – a conglomerate of UK based international aid INGOs) which has been 
bolstered by £5 million in match funding by the UK aid agency, the Department for International 
Development. Clearly, the former represents an enshrinement of preferential treatment for 
humanitarian causes in the tax system whereas the match funding offered to donors to the Nepal 
appeal was manifestly government policy. This distinction is significant as whilst government schemes 
can afford to be selective, the ideal tax incentive system for giving should be, as far as possible, cause 
neutral.
The practice of offering preferential tax treatment for donations to certain causes, even populist 
ones, which are preferred by government should be treated with caution. When we allow government 
to manipulate incentives to support their own agenda we run the risk that the independence of 
civil society as something fully distinct from government could be jeopardised. This challenge is 
demonstrated at its most extreme within our sample of countries by the case of China. Civil society 
in China has largely been crowded out by quasi-governmental organisations known as GONGOs 
(government organised NGOs). Though it is technically possible for all CSOs to apply to be recognised 
and receive donor-incentivised gifts under the Public Welfare Donations Law, such status is rarely 
granted to independent CSOs. The International Center for Not-for-profit Law (ICNL) reports that 
there has been a concerted effort to create “safe” CSOs in China which the government can rely on to 
be supportive. A recent example of how this is being achieved has seen the Beijing Civil Affairs Bureau 
asking civil servants to withdraw from GONGOs so as to leave apparently non-governmental but 
essentially compliant CSOs.41 
Though India has a wealth of independent CSOs, its government has also shown a willingness to blur 
the lines between the state and the civil society. Known as “government NGOs”, organisations such 
as the Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund; the Prime Minister’s Armenia Earthquake Relief Fund; 
the Africa (Public Contributions – India) Fund; and the National Foundation for Communal Harmony 
are essentially government controlled organisations that share status under Income Tax Act Section 
80G with independent CSOs. Whilst many CSOs are registered under 80G to enable them receive 
donor incentivised gifts, this only enables the donor to claim back 50 per cent of the value of their 
donation in tax deductions. However, donors to government NGOs are able to receive a 100 per cent 
deduction. The incentive for Indian companies is even more stark, as in some cases they are able to 
claim a 200 per cent deduction on gifts to government / public entities, which can be offset against 
other income if it results in a net operating loss.
Such examples of the state seeking to muscle in on tax incentives for their own agenda, and even 
wilfully crowd out independent CSOs by offering preferential treatment in granting donor-incentivised 
status to government run CSOs, or offering higher rates of incentives for such organisations, clearly 
obscures the distinction between the state and civil society. 
4.4 Cross border giving
In many ways, the study of the tax treatment of cross border giving offers the best glimpse into how 
tax incentive regimes are, or were in the past justified politically. It is perhaps the most extreme basis 
on which a conversation can be had about the extent to which governments should balance the 
41 International Center for Not-for-profit Law. NGO Law Monitor: China. [Online] 
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moral imperative of the citizenry and commitments to pluralism in civil society against the natural 
desire of policy makers to ensure that they are incentivising in line with the domestic public interest. 
Most policy makers have a natural desire to control the impact of offering tax benefits for charitable 
gifts; in order to ensure to ensure that the primary benefits are felt domestically (i.e. among their own 
citizenry). The extent to which this desire can be tempered in order to allow incentivised cross-border 
giving depends on a range of factors. 
4.4.1  Arguments for and against incentives for cross-border giving
From the point of view of governments and particularly of revenue collection agencies, debate 
about the provision of incentives for cross-border giving will likely be framed according to the subsidy 
rationale discussed in section 2. Accordingly, it will likely be argued that lost tax revenue will not be 
mitigated by an equitable or indeed greater benefit to the nation. This was indeed the case in the 
United States when lawmakers decided to extend the geographical limitation on deductibility to 
individual donors in the 1938 Revenue Act.42 In relation to the earlier 1935 Revenue Act which placed 
geographical restrictions on corporate deductibility, the House of Representatives Ways and Means 
Committee stated in its report that:
“The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to charitable and other 
purposes is based upon the theory that the Government is compensated for the loss 
of revenue by its relief from financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by 
appropriation from public funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of the 
general welfare. The United States derives no such benefit from foreign institutions, and the 
proposed limitation is consistent with the above theory.”43
Clearly, this is an argument that is likely to have some traction with any government that imposes 
taxes. This is amply demonstrated by the fact that no country in our sample of 26 nations has a truly 
open policy that offers tax incentives on the same basis to foreign organisations of any country as it 
does to domestic organisations. 
Despite this, it is noteworthy that many countries in our sample do allow, to differing extents, some 
means of donating for the benefit of beneficiaries abroad, whilst claiming tax incentives on their 
donation. As we will discuss, these options range from narrow and specific domestic vehicles that are 
affiliated to the government, to tax treaties and regional agreements which allow incentives to be 
claimed on direct donations to foreign organisations. Given that tax authorities would ordinarily see 
this as a straightforward tax loss, we might reasonably ask how this can be justified.
One potential explanation is the desire to extend a nation’s “soft power” through cultural and 
economic influence. Many in government have long understood that military power has its limitations 
and that “persuasion through soft power can yield more concession, cooperation, and enduring 
support [...] than coercion alone.”44 The unique nature of philanthropy is recognised as having 
particular relevance in this realm. Being a product of society, rather than government bestows a 
sense of cultural freedom and unshackled human endeavour which often results in a less cynical 
response abroad, and hence enables philanthropy and the organisations it supports to be more 
effective. Paradoxically, allowing independent altruism to leach through national borders has the 
effect of enhancing the national reputation and hence soft power.45 Put differently, “international 
philanthropy—precisely because of its independence from the state— offers a direct, tangible, and 
genuine manifestation of culture, values, and people through action on the ground. This production 
42  Prior individual donors could receive tax deductions on donations to foreign CSOs. Revenue Acts from 1917 to 1935 included no geographical limitations on deductions. The 
1935 Act placed limits on corporate deductibility for foreign donations,
43  H.R. Rep. No 1860 75th Cong, 3rd Sess. 19 (1938). 
44  Josephs, Nye, Jr. (2004) Soft power: the Means of Success in World Politics. New York, Public Affairs.
45  Anheier, A. Simmons, A. (2005) The Role of Philanthropy in Globalization. In: Rethinking Philanthropic Effectiveness: Lessons from an international Network of Foundation 
Experts.  Eilinghoff. D  ed. Bertelsmann Foundation
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of attractive cultural values, in turn, produces benefit—in the form of soft power—that inures to the 
state writ large.”46 Indeed, while some policy makers have worried that large donors such as the Bill 
& Melinda Gates Foundation and the Ford Foundation essentially have a foreign policy profile in and 
of themselves and thus retain soft power rather than passing it on to the state, these are extreme 
outliers. Even if we limit ourselves to talking about foundations, the collective efforts of all but the 
largest organisations “are more likely to create cumulative soft power [... to the] government rather 
than for those organisations individually.”47 
But the above argument for the soft-power benefit of philanthropy becomes less clear when it comes 
to donations to wholly foreign CSOs as the connection, in the eyes of beneficiary communities, to 
the donor is less tangible. Though it could be argued that systems could be developed to require due 
diligence and prove the equivalency of foreign CSOs to that of a qualifying domestic organisation, 
regulators might contest that such a system would be a) extremely difficult to manage and b) prone 
to abuse. However despite compelling fiscal and political arguments against allowing incentivised 
donations to permeate through national borders, in a number of countries in our study such practices 
are common place (as will be detailed below). In many cases, this occurs through domestically-
registered CSOs and foundations that subsequently make grants to foreign organisations, but 
in some instances direct donations to foreign CSOs are permitted. Perhaps the most persuasive 
argument as to why incentives are allowed to be used in this way, even if this was not the intention of 
legislation in the first instance, is the simplest reason of all; need. 
The scale of resources necessary to address the continuing human suffering and inequity that persist 
around the world is difficult to overstate. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
has estimated that the world will have to overcome a US$2.5 trillion investment shortfall to deliver 
on the Sustainable Development Goals.48  For philanthropy to play a significant role as a partner 
in delivering these goals, it must seek to be as effective as possible. However, many thinkers in 
the development sector believe large international NGOs (INGOs) have, often by virtue of being 
headquartered in wealthy nations, become far too dominant as deliverers of development initiatives 
at the expense of local/national organisations with ties to the community and an understanding of 
the context. This is exacerbated by official aid flow from governments. The OECD estimated in 2013 
that only about 1 per cent of Official Development Assistance (ODA) from Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) member countries goes to CSOs registered in the destination country. 
Policy makers are, in spite of globalisation, as likely as ever to see the world through the lens of 
national interest. A narrow reading of the realpolitik foreign policy might well lead one to assume 
that a policy of limiting incentives for giving to organisations and activities which benefit people 
and communities within the national border is inevitable. However, a broader reading explains the 
variety of practice that we see in our study. Firstly, as stated above, there are legitimate reasons to 
allow donations to be incentivised for domestic organisations operating, and even grant making, 
abroad that are in line with considerations of the national interest. Secondly, extending cultural and 
economic “soft power” through philanthropy can help to advance national interest. Furthermore, 
it could be argued that meeting multilateral commitments and investing in the security and 
development of other nations can have both preventative and causal benefits at home. However, 
we should also note the primacy of public demand in advanced democratic societies. Citizens are 
increasingly connected to networks outside of their country through social media and global news 
coverage and their strong desire to help others can weigh heavily on the hand of politicians as they 
pull policy leavers. 
46 Jenkins, G. (2007) Soft Power, Strategic Security, and International Philanthropy. North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 85,
47  Chang, J. Goldberg, J, I. Schrag, N, J. (1996) Cross-border Charitable Giving. New York University
48  United Nations. (2014) Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan – World Investment Report 2014. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
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4.4.2 Approaches to incentivising cross-border giving
The nations in this study have a wide range of approaches to incentivising donations to international 
causes. These approaches can be divided into three categories of ascending openness as detailed in 
Fig 2. It should be noted that this categorisation does not factor in the laws which apply to corporate 
or private foundations which were not part of the scope of our study. However, in many nations such 
entities are able to make cross border transfers allowing donors to indirectly give tax effectively.
 Figure 2 The  range of approaches to incentivising cross-border giving
Model Indicators Explanation
Insulated
Government seeks 
strict control of where 
incentives can be 
gain for donations to 
international causes
No donations for international causes are 
incentivised
No incentives are available for any gift to an organisation 
or programme whose beneficiaries are not wholly domestic.
Government programmes and GONGOs 
operating abroad
The government runs programmes or has a hand in the 
management/governance of organisations that operate 
abroad but that are allowed to receive donor-incentivised 
gifts.
CSOs with special permission or legal status 
to operate abroad
The government provides a list of named, domestically 
registered organisations which operate abroad but are 
eligible for donor-incentivised gifts. 
Hybrid
Law is neutral on the 
location of beneficiaries 
but the recipient 
organisation must be 
domestically registered.
Domestic registered organisations operating 
abroad 
Providing an organisation is established and registered 
domestically, no judgement is made about the location of 
its charitable activities. 
Deductions to ‘Friends of’ organisations It is possible to establish an organisation that can receive 
donor-incentivised gifts specifically to make grants to a 
named foreign CSO. 
Wider legal opportunities for conduit 
organisations
Organisations are able to gain charitable status and receive 
incentivised gifts that, whilst legally under the discretion 
of that organisation, are intended by the donor to reach 
a foreign CSO. These may take the form of donor advised 
funds (DAFs).
Open
It is possible, to a 
greater or lesser extent 
to make donations 
directly to foreign based 
organisations.
Deductions to certain countries with tax 
treaties
Some countries have tax treaties with other nations 
that enable donors to claim incentives on cross-border 
donations against foreign earned income either where 
equivalency has been demonstrated or when registered 
status is deemed to be equivalent.
Regional equivalency Regional agreement/legal precedent establishes the 
expectation that donors should be eligible for incentives 
when donating to any organisation in the region. This is 
technically the case in the EU as a result of the Persche 
ruling. ( ECLI:EU:C:2009:33) 
Any that meet domestic standards of 
equivalency
Foreign charitable donations are eligible for tax incentives 
providing they would qualify under domestic definitions 
and/or due diligence has been undertaken.
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4.4.2.1  Insulated approaches to incentivising cross-border giving
Ten countries in our sample of 26 restrict incentivised giving entirely to domestic causes, or allow 
incentives for overseas causes only in certain and highly prescriptive cases. 
Singapore is perhaps the most striking example of a wealthy nation that operates an insulated 
system of tax incentives for giving. Singapore has a system in which there are no options for donors 
to support international causes tax efficiently. Indeed, donations to support a "foreign charitable 
purpose" are not tax deductible even if they are made to one of the highly-regulated approved 
Institutions of a Public Character (IPC) based in Singapore but operating abroad. Given the fact that 
incentives are offered at 300 per cent of income tax rates this presents a huge relative disincentive for 
Singaporean donors to give to international causes. 
Vietnam represents another strictly insulated system. Donations are only deductible if they are given 
to a qualifying domestic organisation; and in order to establish a charitable organisation or to be 
recognized by the State authority as charitable, organisations are not allowed to operate abroad. 
In Bangladesh, tax incentives are only available for a narrow range of purposes defined by the 
government, which do not currently include international causes. However, the government names 
some specific organisations for which it allows tax-deductible gifts and it is not inconceivable that it 
could choose to do so with organisations operating abroad, although this does not currently appear 
to be the case.
In China, the law appears to leave open the possibility of making tax-deductible gifts to Chinese 
registered organisations which operate abroad. However, in practice, the inability of most 
organisations to legally fundraise and the difficulty that many donors face in claiming tax incentives 
makes this difficult (See section 8). It does appear that whilst corporations would find it difficult 
to make tax-efficient donations to organisations operating abroad, corporate foundations may 
be able to make tax-effective grants to foreign causes, although this is once again unclear. In any 
case, though corporate foundations have flourished in recent years, they seem heavily targeted on 
domestic causes.49 
Turkey is an example of a nation that does not allow incentivised gifts to organisations operating 
abroad, except in highly-proscribed circumstances. For example, Article 89/10 of Turkish Income 
Tax law stipulates that donations to the Prime Ministry, upon natural disasters for which the 
Cabinet of Ministers has taken a decision to launch an aid campaign, can be totally deducted 
from an individual’s income / corporate gains. This could conceivably be for foreign disaster relief. 
Furthermore, Article 89/11 of ITL states that all charitable giving granted to Turkish Red Crescent, 
apart from its commercial enterprises, can be totally deducted from an individual’s income / 
corporate gains. Similarly, this might involve foreign aid activities. South Africa is another country 
which offers incentives for cross border giving only in very specific circumstances. Corporations 
may claim deductions on gifts to institutions undertaking qualifying conservation activities in a 
transfrontier area involving Mozambique and Swaziland, as well as South Africa. Likewise, India only 
permits incentivised gifts to Indian-registered organisations operating abroad if they are promoting 
“international welfare in which India is interested”. As this phrase in the law is not further defined, it 
allows significant government discretion.   
Australia is another example of a nation that is highly prescriptive in the way it grants permission for 
donations to foreign causes to be incentivised. To obtain a tax deduction, gifts must be made to an 
Australian charity which has official accreditation to send money overseas. Typically these charities 
have an Overseas Aid Gift Fund for this purpose. There are approximately 40 charities in Australia 
49  Xiaoming, F. (2013) China’s Charitable Foundations: Development and Policy-Related Issues. Working Paper No. 485. Stanford Center for International Development
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with this accreditation. The funds are only able to be sent for use on projects in developing countries 
(the Australian government has issued a list of approved developing countries).
In the case of some countries in our study, the law is unclear on whether incentives can be claimed 
on giving internationally but the general intent of other legal instruments suggest that incentives 
are unlikely to be claimable. Given the barriers to international contact and funding for Egyptian 
organisations imposed by Law 84 (2002) which, according to ICNL “requires that associations 
seeking funds from Egyptian individuals also secure advance approval from the Ministry”50 it is not 
clear whether this is achievable for domestic organisations seeking to operate abroad or not. Similarly, 
given that under the so called “Foreign Agents” law, Russian CSOs will have to register as a “foreign 
agents” if they receive funding from abroad and engage in “political activities”, it would seem clear 
that the Russian government favours an insular approach to the charitable economy. However, it is 
not specifically stated in the law that Russian donors are prohibited from claiming incentives either for 
donating to domestic organisations operating abroad, or indeed to foreign organisations. 
4.4.2.2  Hybrid approaches to incentivising cross-border giving
As discussed in Section 3.4.1, there appears in most cases to be a compromise, particularly 
in wealthier societies, between the desire to ensure that the benefits of tax incentives are felt 
domestically, and the myriad moral and geo-political arguments for a more expansive approach. As 
a result, half of the countries in our study (13 out of 26) could be said to have a hybrid approach 
to incentivising cross-border giving – albeit that some countries also have aspects of a more open 
model. 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, 
Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and the United States all allow domestic organisations that have 
operations abroad to received donor-incentivised gifts providing that they qualify for such a status 
domestically. 
Though we have not looked at tax laws in sufficient depth to make an assessment for every country, 
we are aware that some countries permit organisations to be established specifically for the purpose 
of supporting a foreign CSO financially and are able to receive donor-incentivised gifts. Such “friends 
of” organisations technically retain discretion over the funds, but there is a reasonable expectation 
that they will transfer them to the foreign recipient. Conduit organisations can allow donors to 
“suggest” a destination for funds whilst the ultimate discretion lies with the organisation with which 
they have made an agreement. 
4.4.2.3  Open approaches to incentivising cross-border giving
None of the countries in our study could be said to have a truly open system of incentives for cross-
border giving in which donors are able to give to foreign CSOs in any nation directly and claim 
incentives. However, donors in some countries in our study are (in theory if not practice) able to make 
donations to foreign CSOs in certain scenarios.
For instance, The Unites States of America has income tax treaties with Canada, Mexico and Israel 
that allow US donors to claim tax incentives on their income from those countries in the US on the 
basis that regulatory standards are seen as equivalent. Conversely, residents of the three nations 
listed above may enjoy the same privilege on donations to US organisations. In addition, the USA 
allows deductions against estate taxes. France, Germany and Italy have similar treaties with selected 
jurisdictions that allow foreign source income to receive incentives.
50  International Center for Non-for-Profit Law. Egypt, NGO Law Monitor.  
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Perhaps the most open approach to tax incentives for cross-border giving exists, on paper at least,  
in the European Union, where a ruling by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has established the 
expectation that, to be consistent with the European Community Treaty, donors should be able 
to claim incentives on donations to a beneficiary organisation in another member state (of the 
European Union (EU) or the European Economic Area) where it can be shown to meet definitions 
and standards needed to qualify as a domestic public benefit organisation. In January 2009, the 
European Court of Justice issued its judgment in the case of Hein Persche v Finanzamt Ludenscheid.  
The case was brought by Mr. Persche, a German national, who made a gift in kind, valued at about 
EUR 18,180 to a Portuguese charity. Mr. Persche claimed a tax deduction in his tax returns but the 
Finanzamt (District Tax Office) refused the deduction on the grounds that the beneficiary of the gift 
was not established in Germany. Mr Persche appealed this decision in the European courts, and the 
ECJ found in his favour, ruling that:
  “1.  Where a taxpayer claims, in a Member State, the deduction for tax purposes of gifts to 
bodies established and recognised as charitable in another Member State, such gifts come 
within the compass of the provisions of the EC Treaty relating to the free movement of 
capital, even if they are made in kind in the form of everyday consumer goods.
 2.    Article 56 EC precludes legislation of a Member State by virtue of which, as regards 
gifts made to bodies recognised as having charitable status, the benefit of a deduction 
for tax purposes is allowed only in respect of gifts made to bodies established in that 
Member State, without any possibility for the taxpayer to show that a gift made to a body 
established in another Member State satisfies the requirements imposed by that legislation 
for the grant of such a benefit.”51
The “Persche ruling” has had a significant impact on policy, and according to the International Center 
for Not-for-profit Law has, “triggered a wave of reform of tax legislation within the EU.”52 However, 
though it may well be the case that regulators and tax authorities across Europe are still acclimatising 
to the new legal landscape and putting systems in place to accommodate cross-border incentivised 
giving, the free movement of incentivised gifts that the ruling seemed to anticipate has not come  
to pass. 
Six nations in our study are members of the EU: France, Ireland, Italy, Germany, Poland and the 
United Kingdom. Whilst legislation in each has been amended to accommodate the Persche 
ruling, this appears to have been done to the letter of the law rather than the spirit. Tax authorities 
have seemingly used bureaucratic complexity, burdensome administrative hurdles and a lack of 
transparent process to limit the availability of incentives for tax incentives for donations within  
the EU. 
For example, in order to claim tax credits in France, the recipient organisation must have either gained 
accreditation by French tax authorities or the donor must be able to prove its equivalency. To achieve 
the latter, it rests on the donor to file evidence that proves that the organisation is comparable within 
French law to a qualifying domestic organisation. The situation in the United Kingdom is even more 
Kafkaesque. After legislating to change the definition of an exempt charity, Her Majesty’s revenue 
and Customs (HMRC) issued a communiqué stating how eligibility would be determined for claiming 
Gift Aid on donations to organisations in the EU. It explained that donations could only qualify to 
nations that could demonstrate a suitable set of powers in regards to exchanging and recovering 
information. The release goes on to explain that HMRC would implement a pre-approval process that 
would result in a list of approved recipient organisation across the EU. The communiqué explicitly 
stated that a list of qualifying countries and a “list of charities that have gained approval will be 
51  Case C-318/07, Hein Persche v Finanzamt Lüdenscheid (2009) ECLI:EU:C:2009:33
52  The International Journal of Not-for -Profit Law, Volume 13, Numbers 1-2,  April 2011,  The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law
32
available on the HMRC Charities website in due course.”53 At the time of writing, neither has been 
published. In Germany, the spirit of the Persche ruling has been side-lined in favour of insular national 
interest: in order to deduct charitable donations to EU- or EEA-based organizations that have no 
activities in Germany, the activities “either have to support individuals which have their permanent 
residence in Germany or the activities could benefit Germany’s reputation.”54
53  Great Britain, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. (2009) General outline: meaning of ‘charity’ and ‘charitable’. [Online] (Cm. IHTM11112). 
54  The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law. (2011) Volume 13, Numbers 1-2,  April 2011,  The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law
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5. Value of incentives
It is clearly evident from our study that the efficacy of tax incentives for giving will be determined 
by much more than their financial value. We have already seen that the way in which eligibility is 
awarded and the causes which qualify are likely to be significant in understanding the likely donor 
response to incentives. This report will also explore the way in which differences in the form that 
incentives take and different approaches to certain categories of donors might impact on donor 
responsiveness. However, any comparative study of tax incentives for giving must give heavy 
weighting to the financial value of incentives to the donor.
Unlike many such studies, we have aimed to consider the value of tax incentives for a range of 
audiences. As well as considering the value of incentives for wealthy donors and companies, we have 
looked at different sized donations at varying levels of wealth to gain a more balanced understanding 
which is inclusive of all donors.
The real effective monetary value of tax incentives for charitable giving has three central components 
which will be explored in detail in this section;
 Rate of taxation
 Rate of incentive
 Caps and floors
5.1  Rate of taxation
We have already observed in section 2 that a meta-analysis of available academic studies shows that 
people are somewhat responsive to tax incentives (or, at least, people in nations where studies have 
been completed are). Though some individual studies show only very weak elasticity, and others even 
find inelasticity, the assumption that giving increases as the relative cost of giving declines remains 
prevalent. However, given the extent to which this assumption remains central to the policy debate on 
tax incentives for giving, it bears far greater scrutiny. 
The assumption of rationality in economics has long been a controversial one. In the early 1960s 
Gary Becker claimed that "everyone more or less agrees that rational behaviour simply implies 
consistent maximisation of a well-ordered function, such as a utility or profit function", and that 
whilst an assumption of rationality implied “lightning-fast calculation, hedonistic motivation, and 
other presumably unrealistic behaviour”55 at an individual level, empirical evidence at the macro 
level continued to suggest that markets are rational. However, there have been persistent findings in 
empirical studies of certain economic activities of irrational behaviour even at the macro level, and as 
a result no orthodoxy has prevailed when it comes to rationality.
What is not in doubt is that the rate of income tax an individual pays necessarily determines the 
potential pot of taxation available to be claimed in incentives. Therefore, it stands to reason that 
when incentives are in place, they become more appealing (in pure value terms at least) as the rate 
of income tax increases. For example, despite the fact that in India the rate of incentive for donors 
is just 50 per cent of the value of a gift, a high rate (30 per cent) tax payer receives incentives of a 
higher financial value than a wealthy donor in Russia, where the incentive rate is actually 100 per 
cent, simply because Russia has a flat 13 per cent rate of income tax. As such, we might rationally 
expect price elasticity to increase markedly as rates of taxation increase. 
Responsiveness to differing levels of taxation by donors has been tested in a study by Gabrielle Fack 
and Camille Landais using data on charitable contributions alongside changes in the marginal tax 
rate in the USA from 1917 to 2005. Over this time span, the rate of income tax for wealthy citizens 
55  Becker, G., S. (1962) Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 70, No. 1, Feb. pp. 1-13. The University of Chicago Press
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fluctuated dramatically from a low of around 10 per cent to a high of 90 per cent, creating a natural 
experiment. The study found that for the richest 10 per cent of the population, price elasticity was 
equal to -0.6. In other words, a 1 per cent increase in the cost of giving – which in this case means a 
1 per cent reduction in marginal tax rate – resulted in a 0.6 per cent increase in donations. However, 
when the authors focused on the top 1 per cent of donors, they found price elasticity to be “not 
significantly different from one” suggesting that the richest 1 per cent would essentially increase their 
donations by the same proportion that their tax bill had increased. Finally, though the data was not 
sufficiently robust to allow a calculation of elasticity, the authors of the study observed a “surge in 
contributions by the top 0.01 per cent of taxpayers from the early 1930s to the late 1960s [which] is 
correlated with the dramatic increase in marginal tax rates for these top income taxpayers to levels 
as high as 90 per cent in the mid-1940s”. The authors concluded that, “the variations in reported 
contributions for the top 10 per cent to top 1 per cent and for the top 1 per cent to top 0.01 per 
cent have been quite modest, compared with the variations experienced by the top 0.01 per cent of 
taxpayers”,56 suggesting that donors only become truly responsive, or “rational”, at the very highest 
income levels.
Table 1      Highest rate of taxation for individuals
 
Country Top  rate of income tax (%)
Japan 50
Canada 46.16
France 45
Germany 45
China 45
United Kingdom 45
Australia 45
United States 45
Italy 43
South Africa 41
Ireland 40
Turkey 35
Argentina 35
Mexico 35
Vietnam 35
Poland 32
Philippines 32
Bangladesh 30
India 30
Peru 30
Brazil 27.5
Egypt 25
Nigeria 24
Singapore 20
Russia 13
Saudi Arabia 0
       
56  Fack, G & Landias, C. (2012) Philanthropy, Tax Policy and Tax Cheating: A Long Run Perspective on US Data. In: Charitable Giving and tax Policy: A Historical and Comparative 
Perspective. Paris School of Economics 
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Assuming the rate of deductibility stays static, increases in the rate of income tax result in a 
corresponding increase in the value of incentives for, and hence a reduction in the cost of giving. 
Furthermore, the evidence, in the USA at least, seems to suggest that higher rates of taxation tend 
to lead to an increase in giving (greater price elasticity), particularly amongst the very wealthy. To 
this extent, an unavoidable conclusion can be made; that those countries with the highest rates of 
taxation not only offer the greatest opportunity for creating generous incentives for giving but are 
likely to see the highest responsiveness to those incentives amongst the wealthiest tax payers.
5.2 Rate of incentive
19 out of the 24 nations in our study (excluding Saudi Arabia, which has no income tax, and Nigeria, 
which has no incentives for individuals) offer incentives at 100 per cent of the value of income tax. 
That is to say; donors can (or in the case of the UK, CSOs can) claim or be exempt from 100 per cent 
of the tax that has or would be paid on the amount being donated. 
Included in the above calculation is Canada, as donors paying the highest rate of income tax 
(excluding surtaxes) can claim 100 per cent of tax paid on a donation back in credits. However, a 
dizzying array of different provincial tax rates and local tax rates which often differ from the rate of 
credit mean that generalisations are difficult and notable exceptions exist. In Alberta for example, 
the highest rate of tax is lower than the highest rate of credit meaning that those making large 
donations could, subject to hitting a cap on net income, claim more in credits than the value of tax 
paid on the donated income. New Brunswick offers the reverse scenario as the highest rate of tax, at 
25.75 per cent is 7.91 per cent lower. 
Ireland, like Canada, has a credit based system; although in this case the grossed-up incentive is 
passed onto the beneficiary organisation. Unlike Canada, Ireland has, since 2013, had a single credit 
rate of 31 per cent of the donation. As a result, high rate (40 per cent) income tax payers receive 
an incentive with a value that is less than 100 per cent (79.8 per cent) of tax paid on gross income. 
However, a person  earning the €32,800 (US$36,457) that is the threshold for the 40 per cent tax 
rate would still receive a credit of 31 per cent of the donation, despite paying only 20 per cent 
income tax. As such, were they also to donate €4,500 (approximately $5,000) they would, or rather 
the beneficiary would, receive a credit worth 155 per cent of the tax liability on gross income for that 
donation. Three other countries offer tax incentives at less than 100 per cent of the rate of income 
taxation: France at 66 per cent, India at 50 per cent (though in limited cases it can be 100 per cent) 
and Bangladesh at 15 per cent. 
Singapore is notable for being the only country that offers all donors incentives at a rate higher than 
100 per cent. The deduction for Singaporean donors has risen steadily from 200 per cent of a donor’s 
rate of income taxation to 250 per cent in 2009 and then to 300 per cent from 2015. Despite the 
low rate of taxation in Singapore (the highest rate is 20 per cent), this unique approach succeeds in 
making Singapore the most tax-effective place in our study for a wealthy donor to give, and likely in 
the world (see Figure 4). However, those on lower incomes pay so little tax (median income earners 
would be in the 7 per cent bracket) that even the 300 per cent rate does not see Singapore offer 
the most tax-efficient system for lower income earners. Though a rational donor would be highly 
responsive to such a generous incentive, there is evidence to suggest that the effect may be less 
pronounced than might logically be expected. Though not directly comparable to tax incentives 
(except arguably for grossed-up forms of incentive as seen in the United Kingdom and Ireland), 
research on the effects of match funding may suggest a broader learning. Studies seem to show 
that above certain limits, price elasticity actually falls relative to the increasing incentive.57 Therefore, 
the merit in setting the value of match funding (and perhaps incentives) above 100 per cent may 
57  Karlan, D. and List, J. A. (2006) Does price matter in charitable giving? Evidence form a large scale natural field experiment. Woking Paper 12338, National Bureau of 
Economic Research.
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be questionable as it may not promote greater giving, and might even actually dampen levels of 
generosity.
5.3 Monetary effect on incentives on donations
The calculations in this section attempt to estimate the tax treatment of comparable qualifying 
donations, and the resulting monetary value of claimable incentives. Clearly, as stated throughout 
this document, the effectiveness of tax incentives is not solely determined by their relative financial 
value. The range of causes on which a donor can claim incentives; cultural norms and expectations 
about giving; the standard of regulation of charities; their independence from government; and 
overarching perceptions about the effectiveness and trustworthiness of CSOs will likely have a 
stronger impact on an individual or company’s willingness to donate. Nevertheless, there is strong 
evidence that tax incentives for philanthropy are effective and that propensity to give increases as the 
relative cost of giving declines. As such, this study attempts to assess the relative monetary value of 
incentives in our sample of 26 nations. 
In order to get a full picture of the financial value of incentives in our sample countries we have 
looked at a range of scenarios: for wealthy donors, “ordinary” donors (of median or modest income) 
and corporate donors. In doing so, we have had to make a number of reasonable assumptions, 
which are highlighted in the text where they apply to a specific scenario.58 It should also be noted 
that we have taken a narrow view of incentives and look only at tax incentives on income which does 
not include dividends or interest. This may very well have a significant impact on the overall picture. 
A separate study which takes the full range of incentives available for all economic activity as well 
as incentives for legacy gifts would be a useful addition to the overall study of incentives but falls 
outside of the scope of this report. 
5.3.1 Wealthy individual donors
In most cases, the key factors in determining the relative financial value of incentives are the rate 
of tax paid by the donor and the effective rate of relief from taxation offered as an incentive for 
giving. For wealthy donors, the effect of these two factors are exaggerated by paying a higher rate of 
tax; with the cost of giving falling significantly where gifts are fully deductible in high-tax countries. 
Table 2 illustrates this effect by taking the example of a donor with an annual taxable income of 
US$1,000,000 making a US$10,000 donation to a qualifying CSO.
58  Assumptions which apply to data for the whole section are:
• Gift is made to an association that has a public benefit purpose which would qualify for incentives in all nations where incentives are offered
• The beneficiary organisation has obtained the most common form of tax exempt status conferring donor incentives
• Calculations are based solely on income taxes and do not include supplementary taxes such as mandatory pension contributions
• The donor is, where a factor, unmarried and with no dependents
• US calculation assumes the donor is a resident of Ohio as it is close to the median state tax rate and does not impose state limits on deductions. Top rate of income tax 
includes state tax
• Canada results are based on Ontario province and are inclusive of state income tax
• France has a wealth tax on assets which can mean an equivalent tax against income of 75 per cent. Donors who choose to reduce wealth tax liability up to a cap of €50k 
cannot also claim against income tax. France has a higher cap on donations below €521 and 66 per cent after
• In the UK and Ireland the value of the Incentive is passed on to the beneficiary organisation
• China calculations are based on a donor being a resident of Beijing
• In Ireland, a flat credit is offered at 31 per cent of the value of the donation resulting in a rate which varies depending on what tax rate a donor pays
• In Mexico, last years taxable income is taken into account for the imposition of the cap on deductions. As such, we are assuming an identical income for current year
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Table 2  Tax treatment of a donation of US $10,000 for a donor with an income of US 
$1,000,000
Country Highest rate of 
income tax (%)
Effective rate 
of relief (%)
Incentive value on a US 
$10,000 donation (US $)
Singapore 20 300 6000
Japan 50 100 5000
Germany 45 100 4500
China 45 100 4500
United Kingdom 45 100 4500
Australia 45 100 4500
United States 45 100 4499
Italy 43 100 4300
Canada 43 100 4,100
South Africa 41 100 3500
Turkey 35 100 3500
Argentina 35 100 3500
Mexico 35 100 3500
Vietnam 35 100 3500
Poland 32 100 3200
Philippines 32 100 3200
Ireland 40 78 3100
Peru 30 100 3000
France 45 66 2970
Brazil 28 100 2750
Egypt 25 100 2500
India 30 50 1500
Russia 13 100 1300
Bangladesh 30 15 150
Nigeria 24 0 0
Saudi Arabia 0 0 0
With individual donations in this example totalling just 1 per cent of taxable income, the percentage 
and value caps placed on the amount that can be claimed in tax incentives are not reached in any of 
the nations in our study. As a result, with the exception of Singapre, which offers an effective rate of 
incentive of 300 per cent, the top 16 most tax effective regimes in the example given, simply line up 
in order of the highest marginal rate of income tax. 
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Figure 3 Incentive value on a US $10,000 donation for a wealthy donor
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Within our sample of 26 nations, the majority (19) have restrictions in place to protect the tax base from 
the cost of unlimited incentives. These caps and floors are discussed in detail in section 6. To understand 
the effect that such limits on incentives have on wealthy individuals, it is necessary to create a donor 
scenario in which they are tested. As such, Table 3 and Figure 4 show the tax outcome when a donor 
has an earned income of US$1,000,000 and donates all of it to a qualifying CSO (subject to above 
assumptions). Though this may seem an unlikely scenario at first, for individuals who have considerable 
wealth in the bank, giving away a large proportion of their taxable income is not inconceivable. For 
example, individuals living off inherited wealth or the proceeds of selling a business or shares may find 
that they are able to make donations which are far in excess of their annual earned income. 
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                                   Table 3         Monetary value of incentives on a US $1,000,000 donation where that accounts for 
100% of the donors gross annual income
 
Country Top 
rate of 
income 
tax 
(%)
Effective 
income tax 
rate on total 
income (%)
Effective 
rate of relief 
excluding 
cap (%)
Cap on 
incentive 
(%)
Cap on 
incentive (US$)
Tax base for 
incentive
Tax incentive value on 
US $1,000,000 donation, 
assuming 100% taxable 
income (US$)
Singapore 20 18.4 300 unlimited n/a 553,365
Australia 45 43.1 100 100 Tax liability 430,654
United 
Kingdom
45 42.8 100 100 Tax liability 428,380
Canada 46.16 44.22 100 75 Net income $418,356
Japan 50 40 100 40 Taxable income 360,800
Vietnam 35 35 100 100 Tax liability 349,755
Philippines 32 31.9 100 100 Taxable income 319,230
Ireland 40 38.9 79.8 100 1,111,475 Tax liability 310,000
United States 45 40.1 100 50 Adjusted gross 
income
299,433
China 45 41.8 100 30 Taxable income 290,400
France 45 44.8 66 20 Taxable income 199,600
Germany 45 43.3 100 20 Taxable income 196,600
Russia 13 13 100 25 Taxable income 130,000
Egypt 25 24.9 100 10 Taxable income 99,900
South Africa 41 39.3 100 10 Taxable income 99,830
Peru 30 29.8 100 10 Taxable income 99,800
India 30 29.7 50 10 Taxable income 99,700
Mexico 35 33 100 7 Taxable income 
(previous year)
68,600
Poland 32 31.7 100 6 Net 60,000
Poland 32 31.7 100 6 Net 60000
Turkey 35 34.5 100 5 Net 50,000
Argentina 35 34.9 100 5 Taxable income 49,950
Bangladesh 30 24.8 15 30 Max donation = 
193,108. 15%. 
Max  deduction 
= 28,966
Adjusted gross 
income
28,966
Brazil 27.5 27.1 100 8 Tax liability 21,645
Italy 43 42.1 100 2 77126 Taxable income 8,420
Nigeria 24 14.2 0 0 n/a 0
Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 0 n/a 0
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 It is immediately apparent from looking at the value of incentives in this alternative scenario that the 
imposition of caps has a profound impact on the relative benefit to the donor when wealthy donors 
give away a large proportion of their income. For instance, when making a donation of $10,000 
at 1 per cent of income (Table 2 and Fig 3) the values of incentives received in Vietnam and the 
Philippines rank 11th and 15th respectively due to the fact that their highest rates of income tax are 
relatively low.
However, by virtue of not imposing caps (except to avoid claiming more than donors have paid in tax) 
they move up to 6th and 7th respectively when making a $1,000,000 donation representing 100 per 
cent of income (Table 3 and Fig 4) Conversely, due to caps against taxable income of 20 per cent and 
2 per cent respectively, Germany and Italy drop from 3rd and 8th place on donations of $10,000  
(1 per cent of taxable income) to 12th and 24th place for donations of $1,000,000 (100 per cent of 
taxable income).
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Figure 4    Tax incentive value on US$1,000,000 donation by an individual, assuming 100% 
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5.3.2 “Ordinary” donors
The focus of study on tax incentives is often on the wealthiest individuals in society. There are several 
understandable reasons for this narrow approach. Firstly, there is a disproportionate interest in 
understanding the behaviours and motivations of wealthy philanthropists amongst CSOs hoping to 
receive donations; philanthropy advisers hoping to improve market conditions in which they have a 
vested interest; and wealthy people themselves, whose interest is rational and self serving. Secondly, 
it is far easier to gain an understanding of the effect of incentives where data is readily available. 
Given that much of the research into the effectiveness of tax incentives has its origins in the United 
States, where only those who itemize their tax returns can claim deductions for charitable donations, 
quantitative research is skewed towards wealthy donors.59 Thirdly, research relating to incentives for 
wealthy donors creates a feedback-loop whereby the disproportionate focus on rich donors fuels an 
assumption that such a focus is normative. Fourthly, there exists a pervasive assumption that wealthy 
individuals are more price elastic when it comes to charitable giving and that this, combined with 
the fact that they pay higher taxes, means that their giving is far more likely to be affected by tax 
incentives. 
Clearly, the assumptions listed above merit some testing. Furthermore, regardless of donor 
responsiveness, it is necessary to consider the question of fairness given that tax incentives for 
charitable donations clearly have differing marginal costs depending on the income of the donor. 
However, in order to fuel a more expansive discourse about the relative fairness of incentives, it 
is necessary to explore the relative value of incentives in our sample nations for what might be 
considered an “ordinary donor”. This is necessary in order to see at what rate of tax incentives would 
be claimed for such a donor.
Defining an “ordinary donor” is of course problematic. On one hand, the average income of 
many nations is heavily skewed by the wealth of the richest in society. This problem is even more 
pronounced when using GDP per capita as an approximation of an ordinary donor. A truer reflection 
of the common experience of earned income is given by the median income. As such, we use data 
from the International Labour Organization60 for most of the nations in our study to provide an 
approximation of an “ordinary donor” income. In other cases we obtained data on median income 
from Eurostat61 or the relevant national statistics agency62. However, in some of the less wealthy 
nations in our study, median income is sufficiently low that it is simply not realistic that such a person 
would be in a position to make a US$100 donation, a somewhat arbitrary amount but a figure large 
enough that donors are likely to be motivated to claim an incentive. As such, in these cases, the 
average income63 was used as it provides a more reasonable approximation of a middle-class person 
who might be in a position to make modest donations.
The above methodology for approximating an “ordinary donor” obviously has some flaws. However, 
given that it is only being used to select an appropriate tax level it provides a sufficiently robust basis 
for assessing the value of incentives to the mass market. Table 4 shows the relative tax bands for 
“ordinary donors” and the resulting value of incentives on a donation of US$100.
59  Itemization of taxes is associated with greater wealth because some of the most common forms of relief claimed relate to high value assets and activities. For example, one 
of the most common forms of relief claimed through itemized tax returns is mortgage interest relief.
60  An approximate median income for Argentina, Brazil, France, Germany, Peru and Russia was calculated by averaging 5th and 6th quartile average incomes. It was obtained 
from the International Labour Organization and is available at www.ilo.org/ilostat
61  Median income for Italy and Poland was obtained from: Eurostat. (2014) Living Conditions in Europe.  Eurostat Statistical Books
62  Median income data obtained from; The Australian Bureau of Statistics, (Australia)  available at www.abs.gov.au, Statistics Canada, (Canada) available at www.statcan.gc.ca, 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, (China) available at www.stats.gov.cn, Central Statistics Office (Ireland) available at www.cso.ie, Ministry of Manpower (Singapore) 
available at www.stats.mom.gov.sg, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (United Kingdom) available at www.gov.uk/government/statistics, US Census (United States of 
America) available at www.census.gov
63  Average income used in Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines, South Africa, Turkey and Vietnam. Data was obtained for the World Bank and is available at 
http://data.worldbank.org 
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Table 4     Monetary value of incentives on a US$100 gift by an ‘ordinary’ donor
Country ‘Ordinary 
donor’ tax band 
(%)
Floor Tax incentive 
value on US100 
donation (US$)
Value of incentive as 
proportion of income 
tax due on donation (%)
Argentina 19.0 19.00 100
Australia 19.0 AUD$2 
(US$1.47)
19.00 100
Bangladesh 10.0 1.50 15
Brazil 22.5 22.50 100
Canada 20.1 20.05 100
China 10.0 10.00 100
Egypt 20.1 20.00 100
France 30.0 22.50 75
Germany 14.0 14.00 100
India 10.0 5.00 50
Ireland 20.0 Euro 250 
(US$276.19)
0.00 0
Italy 27.0 27.00 100
Japan 20.0 JPY2000 
(US$16.1563)
20.00 100
Mexico 21.4 21.36 100
Nigeria 19.0 0.00 0
Peru 15.0 15.00 100
Philippines 25.0 25.00 100
Poland 18.0 18.00 100
Russia 13.0 13.00 100
Saudi Arabia 0.0 0.00 0
Singapore 7.0 21.00 300
South Africa 18.0 18.00 100
Turkey 20.0 20.00 100
United Kingdom 20.0 20.00 100
United States 15.0 15.00 100
Vietnam 15.0 15.00 100
Mirroring the tax treatment of wealthy donors, the nations that offer the highest value incentives for 
“ordinary donors” are those that offer full deductibility/credit but levy the highest taxes. Due to the fact 
that we had to use average income as our approximation of an “ordinary donor” in some of the poorest 
countries in our study, the above-median income figure this represented equated to a generally higher 
rate of tax. As such, the Philippines, which ranked 15th for wealthy donors making a gift at 1 per cent of 
income, ranks 2nd for “ordinary donors” in terms of the monetary value of charitable tax incentives.
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Figure 5 Tax incentive value on US$100 donation for an ‘ordinary donor
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5.3.3 Corporate donors
Private business is the engine room of the global economy and corporations have the resources, scale 
and wherewithal to drive positive change in society through their business and their philanthropy. As 
such, tax incentives for companies can be a powerful tool for positive change, not only through the 
activities that they fund, but also by connecting the private sector to communities. Of course, it must 
be conceded that in some contexts, governments might need to limit potential tax losses. In nations 
where one industry is particularly dominant, or where large multinational companies account for the 
majority of tax receipts for example, allowing a high, uncapped rate of incentive would undermine 
the government’s fiscal position. Though corporate philanthropy can and should play a leading 
role in the development project in nations in which they do business – even taking approaches 
that challenge government policy – the ultimate responsibility, and legitimacy, resides with the 
government.
The above rationale may explain why we generally see lower caps for corporations than individuals in 
our sample and whilst this will be discussed in more detail in section 6.1, in this section we will explore 
the effect that this, and other tax instruments have on the value of incentives that can be claimed 
by companies. In order to test the effect of incentives properly, it was important to recognise the 
massive variation in size and profitability of companies. As such, we have made calculations based on 
companies with annual profits of US$1 billion, US$100 million and US$40 million making a donation 
of US$10 million. This equates to companies giving one, 10 and 25 per cent of their profits in 
philanthropy respectively. Even one per cent would represent a relatively generous gift as a proportion 
of profits. Only 22 of the FTSE 100 companies in the UK reached this threshold in 2012, with the 
median being just 0.7 per cent of pre-tax profits given philanthropically;64 and in the USA the average 
was 0.7 per cent65. Despite this, if we are to analyse the theoretical environment for corporate giving 
in the countries in our study, it is necessary to test the effect of tax incentives on donations which 
equate to a larger proportion of pre-tax profits.
64  Charities Aid Foundation. (2014) Corporate Giving by the FTSE 100. CAF. [Online] 
65 Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy and Giving USA Foundation (2014) Giving USA 2015: The Annual Report on Philanthropy for the Year 2014 
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 Table 5   Monetary value of incentives on corporate donations of US10,000,000 where that 
accounts for 1, 10 and 15 percent of pre-tax profits
Country Corporation 
tax (%)
Incentive 
value (%)
Cap 
(%)
Cap value 
(US$)
Base Value of incentive for donations valuing  
1, 10 and 25 percent of pre-tax profit (US$)
1% 10% 25%
Singapore 17 300 100 Taxable income 
(over 5 years)
5,100,000 5,100,000 5,100,000
Argentina 35 100 5 Taxable income 3,500,000 3,500,000 2,000,000
United States 35 100 10 Taxable income 3,500,000 3,500,000 3,500,000
Japan 33.1 100 0.6 Income, Capital 3,306,000 625,000 250,000
Australia 30 100 n/a n/a 3,000,000 3,000,000 3,000,000
Mexico 30 100 7 Taxable Income 3,000,000 3,000,000 2,800,000
Nigeria 30 100 10 Net income 3,000,000 3,000,000 $1,200,000
Philippines 30 100 100 Taxable income 3,000,000 3,000,000 3,000,000
Germany 29.7 100 20 Gross revenue 2,965,000 2,965,000 2,965,000
Peru 28 100 10 Taxable income 2,800,000 2,800,000 2,800,000
South Africa 28 100 10 Taxable income 2,800,000 2,800,000 2,800,000
Canada 26.5 100 75 Net income $2,650,000 $2,650,000 $2,650,000
Brazil 25 100 2 Net profit 2,500,000 2,500,000 2,500,000
China 25 100 12 Net profit 2,500,000 2,500,000 2,500,000
Egypt 25 100 10 Taxable income 2,500,000 2,500,000 2,500,000
Vietnam 22 100 100 Taxable income 2,200,000 2,200,000 2,200,000
Saudi Arabia 20 100 n/a n/a 2,000,000 2,000,000 2,000,000
Turkey 20 100 5 Taxable income 2,000,000 2,000,000 2,000,000
United Kingdom 20 100 100 Taxable income 2,000,000 2,000,000 2,000,000
France 33 60 0.5 Gross revenues 1,980,000 500,000 200,000
Poland 19 100 10 Net income 1,900,000 1,900,000 1,900,000
India 34 50 10 Taxable income 1,699,500 1,699,500 1,699,500
Ireland 12.5 100 100 Taxable income 1,250,000 1,250,000 1,250,000
Bangladesh 20 20 20 1,026,762 Taxable income 1,026,762 1,026,762 1,026,762
Italy 31.4 100 2 77,126 Taxable income 77,126 77,126 77,126
Russia 20 0 0 n/a 0 0 0
As is the case with tax incentives for individuals in our study, Table 5 shows that corporations in 
nations with the highest corporation taxes enjoy the greatest reduction in the marginal cost of giving 
as a result of incentives. The exception to this rule is Singapore, which despite having a low rate of 
corporation tax (17 per cent) enables companies giving US$10,000,000 to receive a US$5,100,000 
in deductions, more than halving (51 per cent) the cost of giving. This is due to the fact that the rate 
of incentive is 300 per cent of the rate of taxation. The reverse effect is naturally also true in nations 
which offer incentives at less than the rate of taxation such as France (60 per cent), India (50 per 
cent) and Bangladesh (20 per cent). However, once we start to look at donations which account for 
larger proportions of pre-tax profits, we see that caps have a profound impact on the value  
of incentives.
47
Figure 6  Corporation tax incentive value of a US$10 million donation by level of taxable 
income (US$)
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Figure 6 shows the striking effect that low percentage caps have on the monetary value of incentives 
when companies give the same amount but representing different proportions of their pre-tax profit. 
For example, though a Japanese company donating US$10,000,000 would receive the fourth highest 
incentive by value (US$3,306,000) when the gift constitutes 1 per cent of its pre-tax profit, a 
company making the same gift that was equal to 10 per cent of pre-tax profit would receive just 
US$625,000 – seeing it fall to 24th place on that measure.
 25%
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48
6. Caps and floors on relief
In addition to setting values of incentives at less than 100 per cent of the rate at which tax is paid, 
governments in many countries in our sample use a variety of caps and floors to limit the amount 
of relief that can be claimed on donations.  There are a number of reasons that governments might 
choose to use such tools. The principal one is the reduction of tax revenue losses, as argued below, 
but a second possible motivation, particularly in the case of incentive floors, could be to reduce the 
administrative burden for tax authorities. 
A third hypothesis as to why governments favour instituting caps and floors is a desire for fairness; 
although as we will see, the validity of this notion appears to be highly questionable in practice. 
However, there are wider philosophical and political arguments that could broadly be linked to 
equality in the charitable ecosystem which may have more merit.
6.1  Capped relief
Many countries impose a cap on the overall amount of tax relief an individual can receive each year. 
Uncapped incentives, such as those we see in Singapore; and full deductibility, where incentives are 
effectively capped at 100 per cent of taxable income (such as in the UK, Ireland, Vietnam, Philippines 
and Australia) are the exception rather than the rule. Most countries that offer tax incentives for 
individuals impose a cap of some kind.
Caps on incentives are most commonly specified as a percentage of taxable income, and range from 
severe (5 percent of taxable income in Argentina, or − looking outside this report − 0.02 per cent in 
Senegal) to generous (75 per cent in Canada). Some countries set a fixed monetary limit on tax relief 
instead, and this again ranges from a very limited allowance (Sweden allows up to 1,500 krone to be 
deducted − equivalent to roughly US$229) up to a fairly generous one (Ireland imposes a limit of 
€1 million on tax relief). A small number of countries use a combination of the two approaches, and 
specify their caps in terms of the lower of a percentage of income and a fixed amount: Belgium, for 
instance sets its cap at 20 per cent of income or €250,000 depending on which is lower.
The level at which a cap is set can also vary according to the type of gift. The most common form this 
takes is for there to be one cap on donations to not-for-profits and then a different, higher cap (or 
no cap at all) for gifts to particular types of beneficiaries specified by the government (often public 
institutions or affiliated bodies). For instance, within our study, the Turkish government removes the 
cap of 10 per cent on the deduction against taxable income for donations through the Prime Ministry 
for disaster relief and for gifts to the Turkish Red Crescent. Looking outside our sample of nations, in 
Jordan donations to government departments, public or official institutions or municipalities can be 
deducted without limit, whilst donations to charitable organisations are subject to a cap of 25 per 
cent of taxable income. 
Analysis of the Annex to this document will demonstrate that Italy has a complex array of differing 
caps both on fixed monetary value and in the form of percentage caps on taxable income for 
different activities and organisational types. As discussed in 3.3.3. and 3.3.4., the use of differing caps 
can lead to the risk that government might use incentives to advance its political agenda, or at least a 
public perception that this might be the case. Furthermore, such a system may, as will be discussed in 
section 8.2, undermine the effectiveness of incentives as donors are put off by excessive complexity.
The countries that do not cap incentives (up to 100 per cent of taxable income) for individuals 
mentioned above, afford companies the same privilege. However, amongst the rest of our sample 
countries caps on corporate incentives for charitable giving are similarly varied. Some nations cap 
incentives at a much lower percentage of taxable income than they do for individuals. France, for 
example, caps corporate incentives for giving at 0.5 per cent of taxable income compared to 20 per 
cent for individuals. In Japan the caps are set at 0.6 per cent and 40 per cent respectively. Based on 
counting countries which only limited incentives to taxable income as having a 100 per cent cap and 
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excluding Russia (which does not have incentives for companies), Nigeria and Saudi Arabia (which do 
not have incentives for individuals); the average cap across all of the countries in our sample is 41.1 
per cent for individuals, but 35.5 per cent for companies. Whilst, in many countries companies enjoy a 
more advantageous system than individuals, as we explore in section 9, they appear to be subject to 
lower caps against their taxable income. 
6.2 Progressiveness of caps
As is discussed in section 7, there is a legitimate debate to be had about how, and indeed whether, we 
should seek to mitigate the upside-down effect that tax incentives have; whereby those who pay the 
highest rates of income tax have a greater incentive to give. However, caps on incentives are a fiscal 
tool which is predicated not on fairness from the point of view of donors at different points on the 
wealth spectrum, but on the desire to limit tax losses to the public purse. 
That the above assertion is true can be demonstrated in the effect that percentage caps have on 
how a fixed-size donation is incentivised for companies with differing profitability. Figure 6 shows that 
whilst the rate of corporation tax has the largest effect on the value of incentives, low percentage 
caps on the amount that can be claimed against taxable income can radically distort the value of 
incentives on the same sized gift by different sized companies. For example, in France, a company 
that has taxable income of US$1 billion and donates US$10 million (1 per cent) will receive a tax 
credit of US$1.98 million, whilst a company that has a taxable income of US$40 million (25 per 
cent) making the same sized donation would only receive a US$200,000 credit. The situation in 
the identical scenario in Japan is even starker, with each company receiving a deduction, worth 
US$3,306,000 and US$250,000 respectively. Clearly a system where donors receive larger incentives 
for gifts which are less generous relative to their profitability cannot be a system based on fairness 
from the perspective of companies. Rather, such a system is designed as a blunt but simple tool for 
protecting tax revenues. 
One possible justification for imposing caps on incentives for donations could be the desire to prevent 
the excessive influence of the wealthiest individuals and corporations on civil society organisations. 
Given that our research uncovered little evidence of this justification for caps in either political debate 
or academic literature, this hypothesis can probably be rejected, although further research would 
be worthwhile. However, there remains an interesting philosophical argument about whether caps 
allow incentives to target people on lower incomes, and thus ensure that the funding of CSOs better 
represents the interests of the public. In reality, the likelihood is that capping incentives results in 
a loss of income for CSOs, and their beneficiaries. Indeed, this loss of funding has often been the 
principal defence against caps. For example, in 2012 a proposal to cap Gift Aid at 25 per cent in the 
UK was dropped, largely on the basis of the fear that it could cost CSOs as much as £500 million a 
year by some estimations.66 
Interestingly, fixed monetary value caps have the reverse effect. Take the case of corporate tax 
incentives in Bangladesh for example. As shown in Figure 6, a $10 million donation results in a flat 
incentive value of US$1,026,762 regardless of a company’s taxable income (provided that it is less 
than the 20 per cent cap), as this is the maximum value of deductions that can be claimed. This 
means that a company with corporation tax liabilities of US$40 million can claim incentives worth 2.5 
per cent of taxable income, but a company with profits of US$1 million can only claim back 0.1 per 
cent in deductions. The effect is obviously mirrored for individual donors in Italy and the Republic of 
Ireland, which both impose value caps (see Figure4).
66  Oxford Economics. (2012) The potential impact of a cap on Charity Tax Relief. Oxford Economics, May 2012. CAF. [Online]
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6.3 Minimum qualifying donation?
As well as placing an upper limit on the amount of charitable tax relief that an individual can receive, 
some countries impose a lower limit (or ‘floor’) on the size of donations that are eligible for relief. This 
is far less common than having a cap, but there are still a number of examples around the world.
Countries that impose a minimum qualifying donation rule seem to fall into two camps. The first 
are those that impose a reasonably high minimum, presumably with the intention of restricting 
the availability of incentives to those making larger donations. Examples of this former kind include 
Ireland, which has a €250 lower limit on eligible donations and Switzerland, which has a lower limit 
of 100 Swiss Francs (US$101). Though such a policy seems transparently unfair, in that it crowds out 
less-wealthy individuals from being able to claim incentives, it is possible to build a pragmatic case 
for such high minimum qualifying donations based on the perceived problem of “buying the base”. 
Put simply, “buying the base” refers to incentives which merely reimburse donors for gifts which they 
would have made in any case, even without the incentive. It is often presumed (we will investigate 
this claim in discussing different forms of relief in section 7) that those paying lower taxes and/
or with a modest disposable income are less responsive to tax incentives. If we were to accept this 
presumption and conclude that donors at this level would make the same-sized gifts regardless of 
incentives then any incentives offered would merely be “buying the base.” As such, a deduction with a 
floor “has the additional efficiency advantage that it entails less “buying of the base””.67
The second type of floor imposed is a much lower one, designed to establish a minimum level at 
which the administration of charitable tax reliefs is feasible and practical. This sort of floor may not 
even be enshrined in legislation, but rather something that is merely used in practice.  Australia, for 
instance, has an official AUS$2 lower limit on donations that qualify for tax relief; whilst in Japan, 
although there is no official minimum, the threshold for determining the amount of tax relief is 
¥2,000 (roughly £12). Similarly, in Canada there is no official lower limit, but in practice most not-
for-profits do not issue the receipts required in order to claim tax relief for donations of less than 20 
Canadian dollars (roughly £11).
The UK used to have a high minimum eligibility criterion: Gift Aid was originally applicable only 
to donations of £600 or more. This lower limit was subsequently lowered to £250 before being 
abolished in the year 2000 as part of a package of measures designed to boost charitable giving. The 
available evidence suggests that while this change may not have had a huge impact on the overall 
amount of money going to charity, it has had a “democratising” effect, in the sense that a higher 
proportion of the donations now come from those giving smaller amounts.68
Table 7 Countries that have a floor on the claiming of incentives
Individual donors Corporate donors
Australia $2 $2
Ireland €250 €250
Japan JPY 2,000 (annual) n/a
Outside of formal minimum floors, there are other potential impediments to those with only modest 
wealth receiving tax incentives on smaller donations. Whilst many of the general barriers to claiming 
incentives − which will be discussed in section 8 − indirectly affect less-wealthy donors due to their 
lack of access to accounting expertise or personal influence, some nations impose more direct 
barriers on “ordinary donors” ability to claim tax incentives for giving. In some nations, the process 
67  Jean B, H. (2008) The Case for Tax Credits. The Tax Lawyer  61.2: 549–597
68  National Audit Office. (2013) Gift Aid and reliefs on donations. [Online] 
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for claiming an incentive is tied in to other interactions which are associated with wealth. In the United 
States for example, only those who itemize their tax returns are able to claim charitable deductions. 
Given that the itemization of tax returns is closely associated with other socio-economic markers such 
as home ownership,69 in practice this rules many lower-income donors out of the incentive. Indeed, this 
is cited by the US Treasury as a motivation for suspending a trial between 1982 and 1986 in which 
nonitemizers were able to claim deductions: the Treasury claimed that “extension of this deduction to 
nonitemizer taxpayers who on average have only small amounts of deductions – creates unnecessary 
complexity, while probably stimulating little additional giving and presenting the IRS with a difficult 
enforcement problem.”70 Whether administration costs constitute a sufficient burden to counterbalance 
moral considerations of fairness surely rests in the hands of politicians and the electorate, but presumably 
the costs would have to be very high indeed to risk creating a perception that incentives, and by proxy 
philanthropy, is seen by government as the preserve of the wealthy.
69 Robinson, J. (1990) Estimates of the Price Elasticity of Charitable Giving: A Reappraisal Using 1985 Itemizer and Norutemizer Charitable Deduction Data. The Journal of the American 
Taxation Association 12 : 39-5
70 US Treasury. (1984) Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity and Economic Growth: The Treasury Department Report of the President. Office of the Secretary Department of the Treasury. 
[Online]
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7. Form of relief
Alongside the value of a charitable tax relief, the other most important variable is the form in which it 
is offered. This will have a profound effect on nature of the incentive and how effective it is. There are 
three broad forms that a charitable tax relief can take:
1.   Direct deduction: where an individual is allowed to subtract all or part of the value of their 
donations from their income before they are taxed and thereby reduce the amount on which 
they pay tax. This is the most prevalent approach, epitomised by the US charitable deduction.
2.   Tax credit: where an individual is allowed to deduct all or part of the value of their donations 
from the amount of tax that they owe, after this has been calculated. This approach is less 
common than direct deduction, but can be found in a number of countries including France, 
Canada, Spain and New Zealand.
3.   Grossed-up donation: where an individual is allowed to empower a charity or other recipient 
to reclaim all or some of the tax paid on a donation so that it is effectively made gross of tax.  
This is an unusual approach, and appears to be used only in the UK and Ireland.
In addition, as is shown in Figure 7, some countries employ hybrid approaches which take elements 
from more than one of these three principal forms of relief. 
Figure 7  Venn diagram of forms of relief for individual donors
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Each of these forms of relief will be examined in the section as well as what we have termed 
supplementary forms of relief such systems for incentivising gifts of goods and services and for 
allowing citizens to dedicate some of their income tax to charitable activities.
n = 24 nations (excludes Nigeria and Saudi Arabia which do not offer tax incentives to individuals)
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7.1  Deduction
Of the 24 countries in our sample which offer tax incentives to individuals, 18 (or three-quarters) offer 
relief in the form of a deduction from taxable income. Deductions work by taking charitable gifts into 
account before tax is calculated, essentially reducing taxable income by the value of the gift (where 
donations are 100 per cent deductible). 
As we have already discussed, one of the most robust arguments in favour of tax incentives relies on 
the premise that rather than representing personal consumption, tax incentives for charity merely 
reflect the fact that benevolence should not in fact be taxed at all. A core proponent of this position 
in relation to charitable deductions specifically is Professor William D. Andrews who points out that 
“the material goods or services purchased with the contributed funds inure entirely to the benefit of 
persons other than the donor” and as such should not be taxed as personal consumption.71 
Despite such defences, and particularly in light of the apparent popularity of the deductive approach 
to incentivising philanthropy, it is necessary to highlight a popular criticism of deductions for giving: 
that it disproportionately favours the wealthiest in society. Where donations are fully deductible 
against income tax (regardless of caps), donors can merely claim incentives at the highest tax band 
for which their income qualifies them. Perversely, this means that where two donors make precisely 
the same gift, one may receive a greater deduction by virtue of earning more money, despite their 
greater ability to afford the gift. Put simply, “the opportunity cost of virtue falls as one moves up the 
income scale.”72 
Stanley S. Surrey – sometimes called the father of modern tax policy73  after serving as Assistant 
Secretary of Treasury for Tax Policy from 1961 to 1969, as an advisor to the United Nations and 
having taught at Harvard Law School – termed this the “upside-down effect.”74 For Professor Surrey, 
all tax incentives can essentially be expressed as tax expenditure; and only by doing so can we 
accurately judge their fairness. Surrey takes issue with the fairness of tax deductions which are often 
completely unavailable to the poor and tend to rise disproportionately with wealth due to the nature 
of progressive taxation. In illustrating this perverse effect Surrey resorts to satirical sketch writing, 
imagining the reaction of Congress if the Department of Health, Education and Welfare75 had 
enacted a Division of Charitable and Educational Assistance that would distribute its funds as follows: 
Suppose a person calls and says: "I am too poor to pay an income tax but I am contributing 
$20 to my favorite charity. Will the Government also help it?" The answer here will be: "We 
appreciate your sacrifice but we cannot use our funds in this situation."
Suppose a person calls and says: "I am quite well-off and want to send a check for $3,000 to 
one of my favorite charities ..." The answer here will be: "We are delighted to be of assistance 
and are at once sending a Government check for $7,000 to that charity."76 
Andrews concedes that “These are devastating criticisms … [and if] correct, it seems to me the 
provisions in question are indefensible.” However, he considers the criticisms to be “somehow 
overstated and that more sense can be made out of these two provisions than tax expenditure 
analysis immediately indicates.” Whilst Andrews sees Surrey’s analysis as useful in some provisions 
of the tax law as legitimate, like in the case of the exclusion of municipal bond interest, with respect 
to which he thought the “tax expenditure analysis is completely valid”, he finds its application to 
71 Andrews, W. (1972) Personal Deduction in an Ideal Income Tax. Harvard Law Review 86. Harvard Law.
72 Musgrave, R. A.  & Musgrave, P. (1984) Public Finance in Theory and Practice, 4th edition, New York: McGraw Hill.
73 Thurmonyi, V. (1988) Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment. Duke Law Journal. Vol. 1155
74  Surrey, S. S. (1973) Pathways to Tax Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures. Harvard University Press
75 The Department of Health, Education and Welfare is now the Department of Education and the Department of Health and Human Services.
76 Ibid.
54
charitable contribution deductions to be tenuous. For Andrews, charitable contributions literally 
do not fit the definition of personal income popularised by Henry Simons as “the sum of personal 
consumption and accumulation”, 77 because they do not result in meaningful personal benefit that 
might otherwise be taxable:
“A good argument can be made that taxable personal consumption should be defined to 
include divisible, private goods and services whose consumption by one household precludes 
enjoyment by others, but not collective goods whose enjoyment is nonpreclusive or the 
nonmaterial satisfactions that arise from making contributions.”78
Ultimately, in many countries including his native United States, Andrews was defending the winning 
side. But however you judge the strength of Andrews’ retort to the critique of tax deductions offered 
by the tax expenditure argument put forward by Surrey, it is unlikely that it weighed heavily on the 
minds of decision makers. Rather, it seems that policy makers favour considerations of administrative 
burden, price elasticity and possibly the disproportionate influence of the wealthy above those of 
fairness. Take the case of the United States as an example, where it is clear that the perceived burden 
of extending tax deductions to non-itemising tax payers who are typically lower paid, combined 
with assumptions about the responsiveness of that group, trumped concerns about equity. Indeed, a 
1984 Treasury report to the President called for a trial extension of the charitable deduction to non-
itemizing taxpayers to be abandoned, despite the fact that the trial was still underway and would in 
fact clearly show non-itemizers to be responsive79 (if less so than itemizers):
“It is doubtful that the first dollars of giving, or the giving of those who give only modest 
amounts, are affected much by tax considerations. Rather they probably depend more 
on factors such as financial ability to give, membership in charitable or philanthropic 
organizations, arid a general donative desire. As potential giving becomes large relative to 
income, however, taxes are more likely to affect the actual level of donations.”80 
 
Given that a meta-analysis of studies into tax incentives failed to find a statistically significant 
link between wealth and price elasticity,81 whilst other studies have suggested that historically, 
only the extremely wealthy (top 0.01 per cent) show significantly higher levels of elasticity than 
ordinary donors,82 it seems difficult to justify a lack of progressiveness in deductive systems 
based on their increased efficacy in recruiting the wealthy, though this remains a live debate. 
As discussed in section 5.3.2, a great deal of emphasis is placed on wealthy donors, not only 
by policy makers, but also by academics and those interested in charitable fundraising. The 
targeting of wealthy donors is rational from the point of view of any audience seeking to gain 
the maximum donated revenue by targeting the smallest possible audience. Given that both 
those seeking to maximise donations from wealthy individuals and corporations, and also those 
individuals and corporations themselves, have a disproportionate interest in incentives (because 
they often pay higher taxes) as well as an outsized influence on policy makers, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that policy in our study tends to favour deductions that rise at the same rate as 
marginal taxation. It is not possible to say whether this results in an incentive which is more 
effective at incentivising charitable donations than other forms of relief, but it is clear that an 
analysis that prioritised progressiveness would not rate tax deductions highly.
77 Simons, H. C. (1938) Personal Income Taxation. University of Chicago Press
78 Andrews, W. Personal Deduction in an Ideal Income Tax. Harvard Law Review 86. Harvard Law.
79 Duquette, C. M. (1999) Is Charitable Giving by Nonmonetizers Responsive to Tax Incentives? New Evidence. National Tax Journal. June, 195-206
80 US Treasury. (1984) Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity and Economic Growth: The Treasury Department Report of the President. Office of the Secretary Department of the 
Treasury. [Online]
81 Peloza, J. & Steel, P. (2006) The Price Elasticity of Charitable Contributions: A Meta Analysis. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing. Vol. 24, No. 2 pp 260-373.
82 Fack, G. & Landias, C. (2012) Philanthropy, Tax Policy and Tax Cheating: A Long Run Perspective on US Data. In: Charitable Giving and tax Policy: A Historical and Comparative 
Perspective. Paris School of Economics
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7.2  Credits
Five of the 24 nations in our study that offer tax incentives for the philanthropy of individuals offer 
tax credits (21 per cent); two alongside other deductions (Italy and Japan), one as part of a hybrid 
system with grossed up benefits for recipient organisations (United Kingdom) whilst two nations, 
Canada and France, have an exclusively credit based incentive regime for charitable giving.
Whilst the value of a deduction increases as an individual’s marginal rate of tax increases (because 
the adjustment for donations is made prior to tax being applied, meaning it is worth more to 
someone who would have paid more tax on that income), the value of a tax credit is the same for 
all taxpayers (because it is merely used to reduce one’s actual tax bill after it is calculated). This 
means that offering relief in the form of a tax credit is a more progressive approach than offering 
deductions. In his summary of the case for tax credits, Brian Jenn summarises this point well:
“When credits and deductions are measured against each other with equity as the primary 
criterion for evaluation, credits will generally produce a more vertically equitable pattern 
of benefits across income levels. In general, dignitary values and the intuition of Surrey's 
upside-down subsidy critique of deductions will support the use of credits. This is especially 
apparent in the case of the charitable deduction, which grants taxpayers effective power to 
direct government resources to private ends.” 83 
Indeed, both Surrey and Andrews concur that tax credits offer a fairer deal for all taxpayers, 
especially when incentives are viewed as tax expenditure. Andres states that the “more 
comprehensive way to improve the fairness and cost efficiency of tax expenditures is to transform 
them into flat credits. Credits are better targeted because they give the same benefit, per dollar of 
expense, to taxpayers in all brackets.”84 Surrey goes considerably further. He recommends that, to 
eliminate any special benefit for higher-rate tax payers, credits should be included in gross income.85 
Clearly, there is an inherent danger that high-rate donors would be less responsive (rationally so) 
if tax credits were offered at a lower rate than the highest rate of income taxation. To avoid this, 
credits could be offered at the highest rate of tax to all donors (essentially the system in Canada 
until a higher rate was offered in the 2016 budget to appease those paying a new additional tax 
band of 33 per cent over CAN$220,000), though this could be politically problematic given the 
prospect of tax losses amongst generous, lower-income donors. Even presuming that high-rate 
tax payers receive an equal benefit to that which they might gain under a system of deduction, 
they may still prove to be less responsive to credits. There is a great deal of academic literature on 
“prospect theory” which demonstrates that people tend to act irrationally when it comes to weighing 
up potential losses and gains in their decision making.86 Consistently, experimental studies have 
shown that individuals weigh losses much higher than gains in their decision making. This inherent 
“loss aversion” could have important connotations for the effectiveness of different forms of relief: 
studies have shown that people will be in some instances more than twice as averse to a loss as they 
would be to gaining the same value (the “endowment effect”87). Given that higher-rate tax payers 
are typically more responsive to incentives and subject to the greatest tax losses, this could point to 
potentially grave losses of charitable income from wealthy donors. 
Herein lies perhaps the best argument in favour of tax deductions for charitable giving rather than 
tax credits; “as if taxpayers do systematically differ according to income, an attempt to tailor tax 
incentives to the responsiveness of those taxpayers might be justified. In this case, a deduction 
83 B, H, Jenn. (2008) The Case for Tax Credits. The Tax Lawyer  61.2 : 549–597
84 Andrews, W. (1972) Personal Deduction in an Ideal Income Tax. Harvard Law Review 86. Harvard Law.
85 Surrey, S, S. (1973) Pathways to Tax Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures. Harvard University Press
86 Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1979) Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, Econometrica, Vol. 47, No. 2.
87 Thaler, R. (1980) Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.
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might be deemed the most politically feasible means of providing higher marginal incentives to 
higher-bracket taxpayers.”88 
Furthermore, if it is assumed that lower-rate tax payers exhibit low price elasticity, giving what 
they can afford loyally regardless of incentives – although as we have discussed, this assumption is 
prominent however questionable – then credits would merely increase the tax cost of “buying the 
base”. As Jean states, “if lower-income taxpayers are unlikely to be affected by charitable giving 
incentives because they are already giving as much as their budget allows, a below-the-line deduction 
that avoids subsidizing giving that those taxpayers would have undertaken anyways may have an 
advantage.”89
88 Jenn, B, H. (2008) The Case for Tax Credits. The Tax Lawyer  61.2 : 549–597
89 Ibid.
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7.3  Grossed-up donation
In the case of direct deduction and tax credit, it is the donor who receives the benefit of the tax 
break. In the case of grossed-up donations, however, it is the charity that receives the primary benefit. 
This has implications for the nature of the incentive on offer, and the sort of motivation it offers for 
donors.
The two examples of nations offering a grossed-up incentive which benefits the recipient organisation 
are the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom. In both cases, the grossed-up element which 
passes to the beneficiary organisation takes the form of a flat tax credit. In the case of the Republic 
of Ireland, the flat 31 per cent incentive which is passed to CSOs has the advantage of mitigating 
the “upside-down effect” – which sees the marginal cost of giving decrease for those who can best 
afford it – by offering an equal benefit. Similarly, the Gift Aid system in the United Kingdom offers a 
universal credit that can be claimed by CSOs on donations at a flat rate of 20 per cent (this amounts 
to 25 per cent of the value of the donation, as it is calculated as 20 per cent of the grossed-up value 
of the gift). However, in addition, higher rate tax payers can claim a tax deduction of the remaining 
20 per cent (40 per cent tax payers) and 35 per cent (45 per cent tax payers). Clearly, whilst this 
system ensures that all taxpayers are able to empower CSOs to claim an equal grossed-up incentive, 
the additional deduction which can be exclusively claimed by higher rate tax payers means that a 
system which ostensibly avoids the “upside-down” effect retains it, and arguably in an exaggerated 
form.
As discussed above, prospect theory suggests that donors may respond less favourably to incentives 
which are seen as supplementary rather than those which, physiologically at least, have the effect of 
avoiding losses. A grossed-up tax credit which is passed on to the beneficiary organisation (excluding 
higher rate Gift Aid) should, if people were to act rationally (under the “expected utility theory”), be 
no less compelling to the donor than a tax deduction as the marginal cost of giving would effectively 
be the same as the equivalent value credit. However, the “endowment effect” could potentially 
explain why take-up of Gift Aid in the UK remains relatively low90 compared to the claiming of tax 
reliefs in the form of deductions in other nations: the desire to “gain” a subsidy on top of a donation 
may be far less compelling than the desire to avoid losing the entitlement to a deduction.  
It is of course difficult to judge the effectiveness of grossed up donation schemes without having the 
opportunity to see what would have occurred had such a scheme, or an alternative scheme been in 
palace. In the absence of such counterfactual data, we can only judge the uptake of such schemes 
where they exist. In the UK, Gift Aid has been available to donors since the 1990/91 tax year and 
use of Gift Aid continues to grow at a rate of about 1 per cent per annum. By 2012 the proportion of 
donors using Gift Aid had risen to 42 per cent.91 A steady increase in both the uptake of Gift Aid and 
the overall amount being donated through the scheme (about 3 per cent per annum) suggests that 
the Gift Aid scheme is having some degree of success in motivating donors. However, as we shall see, 
administering the scheme and combining it with deductive elements in a hybrid model has weakened 
the effectiveness of the scheme.
Clearly, more research needs to be done to assess how responsiveness changes when incentives 
are passed on to beneficiary organisations rather than the donor. It may well be in some countries 
that a system where CSOs are able to claim – with the consent of the donor – tax back from the 
government, solves structural problems which limit donor responsiveness. Russia, for example, is 
considering such legislation in order to overcome the combination of bureaucratic burden and 
low incentive value (the top rate of tax is 13 per cent) which puts off many donors from claiming 
incentives. Passing on the onus for keeping records to CSOs may well prove effective in getting 
90 Directory of Social Change. (2009) 21 Years of Gift Aid, Directory of Social Change.
91 Ibid.
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more Russian donors to increase donations in the knowledge that the money that they give will be 
augmented when the beneficiary claims a tax credit from the government in their name, without 
them having to make a claim themselves.
7.3  Hybrid systems
Of the 24 nations in our sample of 26 which offer incentives to individuals for their charitable giving, 
four are examples of hybrid approaches. In Japan, for instance, donors are able to choose whether 
to take tax relief in the form of a deduction or a tax credit. However, it is quite hard to judge the 
effectiveness of offering such a choice because the overall system of charitable tax relief in Japan is 
among the most complex in the world, and presents significant barriers to donors using it effectively.
The UK also has a hybrid system, but it is a hybrid between a grossed-up donation and a direct 
deduction approach. The main form of tax relief in the UK is Gift Aid, through which UK taxpayers 
can empower charities to which they have made a donation to reclaim the basic rate of tax paid on 
that donation on their behalf. Those who pay higher-rate tax can get additional relief, but this time in 
the form of a personal tax deduction. Through the self-assessment tax system, a higher-rate taxpayer 
can claim back the difference between their highest marginal rate of tax and the basic rate of tax 
paid on any donations made in the tax year. 
The hybrid nature of the UK system has been a source of controversy, as some have argued that 
it is both unfair in principle92 and ineffective in practice93 to offer different tax reliefs for basic rate 
and higher rate taxpayers on donations of the same kind. Whilst that is a debate that continues to 
rumble on, the one thing that is certain is that having a hybrid system creates confusion. Research 
consistently shows that awareness of the higher-rate reclaim element of Gift Aid remains low.94 
Hence, although it is an important incentive for those who do take advantage of it, it is significantly 
under-utilised across the piece.
7.4  Supplementary forms of relief
In addition to adopting different forms of relief from income taxation, many of the countries in our 
study have differing approaches to incentivising gifts of goods and services whilst others allow a 
portion of income taxation to be channelled directly to charitable causes at the point of collection. 
7.4.1 Donations of goods or assets
The primary focus of charitable tax incentives in most countries is cash gifts. However, a significant 
number of countries also offer tax relief for donations of goods or assets. This is most notably the 
case in the US, where non-cash donations are an important part of the landscape of charitable 
giving; accounting for over $30bn of deductions in 2010.95 
Canada and Mexico also allow non-cash donations to be deducted from income tax, but outside 
North America, the list of countries that allow donations in kind does not appear to show any real 
rhyme or reason: it includes, for instance, Germany, the Philippines, South Africa, Turkey and Vietnam.
The main issue with allowing tax relief on donations in kind is that it requires there to be a system 
of broadly objective assessment of fair market value in order to avoid widespread abuse and error 
through overvaluation of goods. This has been a major issue in the US in the past, and despite 
marked improvements it continues to be a problem today. A 2012 US Treasury report estimated that 
$1.1 billion of tax income was lost in 2012 due to incorrect deduction of non-cash donations.96 
92 Toynbee, P. (2012) On charity George Osborne must stand up to the self-interested super-rich. [editorial] The Guardian. [Online] 
93 Scharf, K. & Smith, S. (2009) Gift Aid donor research: Exploring options for reforming higher-rate relief. Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs.
94 See, for instance: Scharf, K. & Smith, S. (2009) Gift Aid Donor Research: Exploring options for reforming higher-rate relief. HM Revenue and Customs/HM Treasury. 
95 Liddell, P. & Wilson, S. (2010) Individual Noncash Charitable Contributions 2010. Internal Revenue Service. [Online]. NB: for the purposes of ensuring that this figure was of 
most use for comparisons with other countries, donations of corporate stock were excluded, as they receive different tax treatment in other jurisdictions.
96 US Treasury. (2012) Many taxpayers are still not complying with noncash charitable contribution reporting requirements. US Treasury Inspector General for Tax 
Administration, [Online] 
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In some countries, the concern about abuse or error leading to over-claiming for gifts in kind has 
meant that while such gifts are allowed, there is not a standardised rule entitling individuals to 
claim deductions for them. Instead they are dealt with on a case-by-case basis, where a tax official 
determines whether there is sufficient evidence that the donation has been made and that the 
valuation of the donated goods is accurate. A system likes this operates, for instance, in Vietnam. 
However, this is obviously only practical where a small number of in-kind donations are expected. 
If these sorts of donations become more common, it is likely that a more standardised system of 
valuation and deduction claiming would have to be introduced to avoid the administrative burden 
becoming impractical.
7.4.2  “Percentage rules”
There is a further mechanism in a number of countries that allows individuals to use the tax system 
to their advantage in making donations. This is the system often called “percentage philanthropy”, in 
which individuals are allowed to nominate for a small percentage of the tax they have paid to go to an 
approved charitable organisation rather than into the normal State coffers.
This is not strictly speaking a tax relief, however as it involves using the tax system to encourage 
charitable giving and enable individuals to support not-for-profits more effectively it is relevant to 
many of the issues discussed in this report.
The origins of percentage philanthropy lie in the division of Church and State in mainland Europe 
in the 19th and 20th centuries. This led to governments looking for mechanisms to enable people to 
continue to support religious institutions effectively. In Germany and Austria, this took the form of a 
compulsory tax on all members of the church, but in the predominantly Catholic countries of Southern 
Europe (Spain, Portugal and Italy), it took the form of a voluntary contribution from tax available to all 
taxpayers for secular as well as religious purposes. It is this that provided the model for modern forms 
of percentage philanthropy.
The idea of percentage philanthropy may have originated in Southern Europe, but it has reached its 
most developed form in Central and South-eastern Europe. A number of countries in this region have 
adopted percentage rules in their tax system as a mechanism to encourage support for not-for-profits, 
in recognition of the fact that their civil society infrastructure is comparatively weak. Countries that 
have done this include Hungary, Slovakia and Lithuania, which all have “two per cent rules”, and Poland 
and Romania, which have a “one per cent rule”.
There is a valid question about whether the money directed through percentage rules can really be 
called a donation or whether it is merely a form of taxation. However, leaving this concern aside, 
there is also research to suggest that percentage rules can be an effective tool for developing a 
culture of charitable giving in countries that have no real philanthropic tradition.97 As such they are an 
interesting policy idea to consider.
97 Gerencsér, B. & Oprics, J. (2007) The Role of Percentage Designation in Creating a Culture of Giving. Nonprofit Information and Training Centre Foundation.
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8. Barriers to claiming incentives
In addition to justification on moral grounds, tax incentives for charitable giving can be judged in 
terms of their effectiveness in motivating greater generosity. This is important when considering the 
complexity of incentives and the bureaucratic hurdles faced by donors in claiming them, as whilst 
incentives might be in place and even appear generous on paper, the ability of donors to understand 
and claim, and their experience of the process will impact on the effectiveness of incentives in 
motivating increased giving.
8.1  Bureaucratic barriers
We have already seen from the case of the United States that where incentives are claimed through 
the self filing of itemized tax returns, this can present a considerable barrier to donors of a modest 
income who either are not required to itemize for other areas of their finances, or lack the knowledge 
to be able to do so. According to Brian Jenn’s calculation for 2004, only about 35 per cent of 
taxpayers in the US chose to itemize, leaving a majority of taxpayers unaffected by tax incentives.98 
Clearly, such a system creates a significant barrier for donors who are less likely to itemize tax 
returns merely to claim charitable deductions where they do not have more financially compelling 
reasons – such as mortgage deductions – to do so. As such, bureaucracy is a significant barrier to the 
effectiveness of incentives for a large part of the population. Given that the majority of nations in this 
study follow a similar deductive system of tax incentives for giving, this is very likely a common barrier 
to claiming incentives. For example, Turkey only allows donors who file tax returns to claim incentives 
and experts consulted as part of this report suggested that this would likely rule the vast majority of 
ordinary donors out of the reliefs on offer.
Tax deduction is the most common form of incentive in our sample of 26 nations. Indeed, 18 of the 
24 nations which have incentives for individuals (with a further 3 having hybrid systems) and 24 of 
the 25 nations which offer incentives for corporations do so in the form of tax deductions. As such, 
as in the case of the US, the filing of tax returns will, to differing extents, have an effect of donor 
responsiveness. for giving In Russia, the fact that the highest rate of income taxation is just 13 per 
cent means that any administrative burden in declaring gifts made over the year may be sufficient to 
put donors off making claims. In addition, requirements to include the paper trail involved in making 
donations in declarations is incompatible with the growth of online donations which neither involve 
paperwork or direct contact with the recipient organisation. 
In some nations the bureaucratic barriers to claiming incentives are not limited to the experience of 
the donor in filing claims but also in tax authorities processing them. This is seemingly an issue in the 
People’s Republic of China, where limited knowledge of deductibility of charitable gifts amongst tax 
authorities means that the employment of an accountant and/or considerable influence is required 
to ensure that even an accurately-filed return results in the proper deduction.99
8.2 Complexity
As we have already seen, incentives are often judged by the extent to which they ellicit a high degree 
of price elasticity in donors. Whilst this report finds that judgement to be overstated given the range 
of alternative justifications for tax exemption, it is clearly important that donors are responsive 
to incentives which have cost implications for government. As such, the extent to which donors 
understand the incentives on offer and how to claim them is significant. We have already seen that 
bureaucratic barriers can put off donors as the effort they need to make to claim outweighs their 
desire to do so. However, the underlying complexity of the incentives on offer can also have the effect 
of dulling responsiveness. 
98 Jenn, B, H. (2008) The Case for Tax Credits. The Tax Lawyer  61.2 : 549–597
99 Council of Foundations. (2014) China, Country Notes. [Online]
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In the case of Brazil for example, donors must have a grasp on which causes they may claim an 
incentive for donations to and at what level incentives for donations to those causes are capped. 
This patchwork system (as described in section 4.1) is extremely difficult for donors to conceptualise. 
For instance, a Brazilian donor planning to give tax effectively must know which causes attract 
incentives (child, adolescents and elderly, sports, culture, cancer and handicapped projects), have an 
understanding of the different caps (1 per cent for handicapped and cancer projects and 6 per cent 
for other causes), the total limit (all donations must add up to less than 8 per cent) and when they 
plan to claim (the total limit drops to 3 per cent if claiming for the previous tax year). In addition, 
the fact that CSOs in Brazil have to register for donor-incentivised status each year and often lose 
eligibility makes tax planning even more complicated. 
Brazil is not an isolated example of a tax incentive system where complexity might undermine donor 
responsiveness. Other examples of systems that are complex to the extent that many donors are 
unable to properly understand the incentives available and rules for claiming include Bangladesh 
which offers incentives at 15 per cent, capped at 10 per cent of tax liability making it difficult for 
donors to easily calculate the value of incentives on donations. Likewise, hybrid systems such as Italy, 
which allows donors to choose between deduction or credit with caps at differing rates for different 
causes and organisation types, and the UK, which requires high rate tax payers to calculate both a 
grossed up donation at a flat rate and a deduction on remaining tax liability. Provisions designed to 
enable CSOs to claim Gift Aid on small donations are a proxy for the scheme as a whole in that even 
sector experts complained that they found it difficult to understand.100 
 
100 Pudelek, J. (2012) Government must rethink ‘complicated’ Gift Aid scheme for small donations, sector leaders say (Online) Third Sector, 25 May. [Online article]
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9.  Incentives for individuals verses incentives for 
companies
The extent to which you believe it is important for governments to offer tax incentives on the same 
terms for individuals and corporations may degree on the extent to which you favour pragmatism 
over balance and progressiveness. For example, it may make sense in some instances for governments 
to make tax incentives particularly appealing for companies where, as is the case in developing 
countries with large reserves of natural resources, they account for the vast majority of tax receipts. 
In this instance it could be argued that the extra cost of administering tax incentives for individuals 
would not be worthwhile as here are too few people paying the highest rates of tax. As such, it might 
seem sensible to offer more generous incentives to companies than individuals, or as is the case in 
Nigeria, offer no incentives to individuals at all. Similarly, a wealthy nation may see fit to prioritise 
individual donors as their mass engagement in civil society could enhance social cohesion as wider 
involvement in charitable giving is associated with other positive social behaviours.101  
On the other hand, prioritising pragmatic concerns above progressiveness may in fact prove to be 
counterproductive. Consider for example, a nation where companies receive far greater incentive to 
give than individuals. In this instance, individuals might perceive some sense of political collusion 
between government and the private sector or judge the motivations of corporate donors to be 
related to tax avoidance. In such a circumstance, companies would likely give less to avoid triggering 
negative public perceptions. 
For the above reasons it is necessary to compare the differing responses of the countries in our 
sample and to try and locate the appropriate balance between the need to create equality between 
treatment of different types of donors, and the need for pragmatism. 
9.1  Incentivising only one type of donor
Amongst the 26 countries included in our study, it is notable that three nations offer tax incentives 
for charitable giving to one type of donor and not the other. Nigeria and Saudi Arabia do not offer 
tax incentives for individuals but they do offer deductions to companies.  In both Nigeria and Peru, 
tax incentives for charitable giving are only offered to companies. In the case of Nigeria, companies 
pay a flat rate of 30 per cent corporation tax but are able to claim tax deductions on gifts totalling up 
to 10 per cent of their taxable income. The top rate of income tax in Nigeria for individuals is 24 per 
cent, but no tax incentives for charitable giving are available.
 
It appears that Nigeria is part of a significant, if under-appreciated, typology of charitable tax 
incentive jurisdictions which offer incentives for companies making donations, but not for individuals. 
In all, The Rules to Give By Index102 identifies 28 nations that have corporate-only incentive regimes. 
Seven of these nations are former Soviet nations in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, but the most 
significant concentration is, like Nigeria, in sub-Saharan Africa, where 12 nations fit this model. The 
drivers of this trend are not clear. It might be that at the time they were deciding policy, these low-
income nations which are also host to large multinational extractive industry companies saw a far 
greater benefit in offering incentives to companies than they might have in creating incentives for 
individuals. However, regardless of the initial rationale for favouring such a model, it does not seem to 
be practicable in the long term as even amongst low income nations (as defined by the World Bank), 
the proportion of individuals giving to charitable causes every month according to the 2013 World 
Giving Index in countries with tax incentives for individuals was 9 percentage points higher (27 per 
cent) than in those that did not (18 per cent).
101 Charities Aid Foundation. (2013) Britain’s Civic Core: Who are the people powering Britain’s charities?  Charities Aid Foundation.
102  Quick, E., Kruise, T. & Pickering, A. (2014) Rules to Give By: A Global Philanthropy Legal Environment Index. Nexus, McDermott, Will & Emery and Charities Aid Foundation 
(CAF).
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In the case of Saudi Arabia, this is mostly a moot point because Saudi and Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) member country citizens do not pay income tax. This is in fact the case in 12 nations, and it 
scarcely makes sense to criticise a lack of tax incentives in a jurisdiction in which people do not pay 
income tax. However, the case of Saudi Arabia is not without interest. Saudi and GCC citizens pay 
a mandatory zakat103 of 2.5 per cent of income which is collected by the state and distributed to 
the poor. This is a religious duty that has, in Saudi Arabia (as well as Libya, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia, Sudan, and Yemen)104 been mandated by the state, and as such is not charitable either in the 
sense that it is volunteered money or in the sense that it allows for the development of a civil society 
by allowing people to advance their agency through giving. Whilst Saudi and GCC companies also 
pay zakat, unlike individuals they pay 20 per cent corporation tax (and up to 85 per cent if involved in 
the production of oil and hydrocarbons). Full deductibility on this tax liability is offered for companies 
on donations to accepted charitable purposes (which are fairly limited). Though this reality is merely a 
product of a tax system which favours individuals, it does have some perverse implications for foreign 
nationals working in Saudi Arabia who are, unlike the companies for which they work, unable to claim 
tax deducations on the 30 per cent income tax that they pay. 
Russia was the only nation in our sample that offered tax incentives for charitable giving to 
individuals but not to companies. Indeed, according to the Rules to Give By Index105, it is the only 
country to have such a regime.  Whereas individuals are able to deduct the value of their donations 
up to a cap of 25 per cent of taxable income (income tax is a flat 13 per cent), companies cannot 
deduct gifts against corporation tax but can merely deduct from their value added tax (VAT). 
Considering that newly-formed companies were the trail-blazers for philanthropy in Russia after the 
fall of communism106, it seems curious that they have not been incentivised to develop their giving 
further. 
9.2 The value of corporate verses individual incentives
A more comprehensive appraisal of the differing values of incentives and the imposition of caps on 
relief in our 26 sample nations is provided in the “Value of Incentives” and “Caps and floors on relief” 
sections. However, it is worth noting some significant differences in the value of incentives and the 
imposition of caps on what can be claimed in some nations between individual and corporate donors. 
  In Bangladesh, individuals are able to claim 15 per cent of the value of a donation in 
deductions from taxable income subject to a cap at the minimum between BDT15m and 30 
per cent of taxable income. Companies in Bangladesh can only claim 10 per cent of the value 
of their donation in deductions and the cap is at the minimum between BDT80m and 20 
per cent of taxable income. Given that corporation tax is between 27.5 and 45 per cent, and 
the top rate of income tax is 30 per cent, this perhaps points to the perception that smaller 
incentives are still compelling for those paying higher rates of tax.
  In France, individuals can claim 75 per cent of the value of donations up to €521 and 66 
per cent over that amount, up to 20 per cent of taxable income. Companies have a simpler 
system to reckon with, and can claim 60 per cent of the value of their donation against 
their taxable income without being subject to a cap. Given that companies pay 25 per cent 
corporation tax whilst individuals can pay as much as 75 per cent income tax (including 
wealth tax) this clearly is a system that favours corporate giving.
103 Zakat is the third Pillar of Islam which, rather than being considered as strictly charitable, is given on the basis of religious duty, specifically for the benefit of the poor. 
104  Powell, R. (2009) Zakat: Drawing Insights for Legal Theory and Economic Policy from Islamic Jurisprudence. University of Pittsburgh Tax Review, Vol. 7, No. 43. Seattle 
University School of Law.
105   Quick, E., Kruise, T. & Pickering, A. (2014) Rules to Give By: A Global Philanthropy Legal Environment Index. Nexus, McDermott, Will & Emery and Charities Aid Foundation 
(CAF). 
106 Chertok, M. (2014) Philanthropy in Russia — an insider’s view. Interview in Philanthropy in Focus. WINGS. [Online]
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  In Italy, individuals can claim either 19 or 26 per cent of their donations back, either in tax 
deductions or credits depending on the cause or organisation type – factors which also relate 
to a range of different caps. Companies, on the other hand, enjoy 100 per cent tax deduction 
for their donations subject to a 2 per cent cap. As we will point out in section 8, complexity 
may be a barrier for some donors. For companies to enjoy more generous incentives and 
less complexity despite their greater capacity to navigate the bureaucracy seems likely to 
contribute to a sense of cynicism amongst individual donors. 
It may be legitimate for some nations to impose different percentage caps on companies and 
individuals considering, in general, the relative scale of their resources. Certainly, there is evidence 
that this assumption is borne out in policy in our sample of nations. As discussed in section 6.1, the 
average cap on individual donations as a proportion of taxable income comes in at 41.1 per cent, 
compared to 35.5 per dent for companies. Other nations, such as India, have higher rates of tax 
for corporations (34 per cent) than even the wealthiest individuals (30 per cent). However, many 
nations seem to aim for equity in the tax incentives values regardless of the varying rates of taxation 
on companies and individuals. Argentina, Australia, Egypt, Germany, Mexico, South Africa, Turkey 
and Vietnam all offer the same percentage values and caps to companies and individuals in their 
charitable tax incentives regimes.  
For the purpose of sending a clear message to all donors, an ideal scenario would be to aim for parity 
in incentive rates. Where percentage caps exist – although ideally they wouldn’t – these should also 
be equal for individuals and companies, but in recognition of the relative scales (on average at least) 
of giving between the two donor types, an additional value cap on tax deductions for companies 
could be imposed. 
9.3 Different processes for claiming incentives
As stated in the “Form of relief” section, there are advantages and weaknesses to the three processes 
for offering tax relief on charitable donations. The choice to follow a tax deduction, tax credit or 
grossed-up donation model is one which has important implications for the administration, fairness 
and complexity of a tax incentive regime. However, several of the countries in our study have, by 
choosing to offer one of those three choices to individuals and another to companies, amplified all 
three of those concerns. 
In both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, individual donations and corporate 
donations are treated differently; with individual relief coming in the form of grossed-up donations 
and corporate reliefs coming in the form of tax deduction. As a result, individual donors essentially 
have their donations topped up by 25 per cent (with higher rate tax payers receiving a 20 or 25 per 
cent deduction on top of this), meaning that the relief is passed on to the CSO rather than back to 
the donor. Companies, on the other hand, receive the full benefit of the relief. 
In Canada, individuals receive a tax credit whilst companies receive a tax deduction for their 
donations. Curiously, individual donors in Japan are able to claim either a tax credit or a tax deduction 
providing that certain requirements are met. Companies on the other hand are only able to claim a 
tax deduction. There is, as stated in the “form of relief” section, a strong argument that a tax credit 
system is more equitable as the value of the relief will be the same regardless of the rate of tax 
paid. Where the rate of taxation is flat, then a system of deduction might seem equally fair though 
as is the case in Canada, reductions for small business actually have the result of offering greater 
incentives to larger companies. As such, Canada has a system that is progressive for individuals but 
not so for companies. 
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Outside of differences in the form that relief takes, we should also note the impact of the bureaucratic 
process on the ability and willingness of donors to claim incentives and hence their efficacy. In China, 
a lack of clear, simple and well-publicised tax exemption regulations and procedures for individual 
donors continue to suppress the uptake of incentives for individuals. At the same time, an increase in 
the deductibility of charitable gifts from 3 to 13 per cent for companies and a simpler process (and 
capacity) for claiming those incentives has meant that corporations provide 60 per cent of donations 
in China.107
9.4 Different causes incentivised
Our study has revealed that a number of countries offer tax incentives to different causes for 
individual and corporate donors. In Vietnam, the list of charitable purposes for which individuals and 
companies can claim tax incentives is almost completely different. Bangladesh has a wide range of 
charitable purposes (20 purposes) for which companies can claim tax incentives compared to a much 
narrower list for individuals (eight purposes). Similarly, in Brazil, companies are able to claim incentives 
for donations to organisations with a broad scope of social purposes on top of the purposes under 
which individuals can claim incentives for donations. Though a number of countries, such as Brazil 
and Italy, have differing values for tax incentives to different causes, some of those rates are not 
consistent between individuals and companies. 
107 Council of Foundations. (2014) China, Country Notes. updated in 2014. [Online]
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10. Conclusion
This report has attempted to provide a meaningful starting point for a proper discourse on the 
merits and weaknesses of the various tax incentive regimes for charitable giving in place around 
the world. The approach that we have taken, and advocate for others to adopt and build on, is 
a holistic one which looks beyond the financial value of incentives and includes factors such as 
political justifications, cause and organisational eligibility, donor accessibility and fairness. Such 
an approach has, within our limited sample at least, suggested an unanticipated appraisal of the 
dominant conception of tax incentives for giving; that we both overestimate and underestimate their 
importance. 
On the one hand, though there is good evidence that donors are responsive to tax incentives (though 
perhaps less so than we might think), the relative value of incentives may be less important than 
the form in which they are offered, what causes and organisations are eligible and how accessible 
they are. As such, the tendency of CSOs, donors and philanthropy advisors to focus on the value of 
incentives and their associated caps and floors – though clearly important – could be challenged 
by a call for a more holistic focus on the system of tax incentives. Such an expanded focus seems 
to suggest a very different weighing of the significance of tax incentives. Viewed from this more 
elevated vantage point, this report suggests that we may in fact be underestimating the importance 
of incentives for giving as the potential crowding out effect that incentives have on those causes, 
organisation types and donors which are excluded can have a determinate impact on the size, 
political balance and social representativeness of the sector which in turn could influence public trust 
and ultimately participation in charitable giving.
There is great variety in the incentive systems in our sample of 26 nations. The form of incentives, 
their value, caps and floors placed on them and differing definitions of what causes, legal forms and 
to which jurisdictions donors can give and be eligible to receive them all differ across our sample 
countries. Perhaps this is not surprising as charitable giving and civil society more generally is heavily 
influenced by the distinct political, economic and social history of a given country as well as factors 
such as tradition, culture and religion. 
Yet our study has shown that most governments tend to either happen upon a model for offering 
incentives over time as a consequence, often without intention, of wider tax policies and legal rulings, 
or else copy the basic model of another nation and retrofit that model to their own context. In either 
case, none of the incentive regimes in our study seem to have been developed using an iterative 
process which allows for holistic redesign and adaption to provide maximum benefit and fairness 
for all concerned. Rather, tax incentive regimes have been subject to ad hoc changes motivated by 
political pragmatism, demand from donors and beneficiaries or reactive adaptation to changing 
social economic or technological contexts. 
This might be expected given two important factors which may limit a more holistic approach to 
developing tax incentive policy. Firstly, there is a paucity of comparative research on tax incentives 
which explores not only the differing models in existence around the world but also works through 
the political and philosophical justifications underpinning differing approaches. This report has 
contributed to those ends, but much more research is needed. For instance, given that donor 
responsiveness to incentives dominates the policy conversation, it is striking that longitudinal studies 
have not taken place in most countries which track charitable giving over time to see the effect of 
policy changes on the level of giving. 
A second reason for the lack of innovation in tax incentive policy for charitable giving could be that 
as charitable giving in a nation grows, interested parties in civil society and in government become 
increasingly reticent to risk unbalancing the existing framework. Such conservatism could be seen as 
rational as in the absence of clear comparative data on the effectiveness of other models for offering 
tax incentives, most people with an interest in CSOs would likely take a risk averse approach. However, 
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the ossification of tax incentive policy may have deeper roots than even the most persuasive evidence 
could dislodge.
In many nations the current laws pertaining to CSOs and charitable giving were developed at a time 
of rapprochement between the state and civil society following a period of social upheaval and 
oppression. In many cases, this marks a high point in cross sector relations due to the fact that civic 
activism has to some extent succeeded in changing or influencing government. Take the extreme 
case of South Africa for example where following the apartheid and a period of consultation with 
the sector, the new NPO Act included the extraordinary provision that “every organ of state must 
determine and co-ordinate the implementation of its policies and measures in a manner designed to 
promote, support and enhance the capacity of nonprofit organisations to perform their functions”.108 
South African CSOs now find themselves defending laws and provisions for CSOs and donors which 
were drawn up in more idealistic times rather than pushing for improvements out of fear that 
changes, if they were to occur, would likely be negative. 
Of course, it is no surprise that the extent to which CSOs and donors are likely to push for 
improvements in the tax incentive regime is determined by the direction of travel in government 
policy. It may well be that some of the nations in our study which have restrictive systems 
(as described below) are in fact improving and that they are exactly the places in which the 
recommendations of this report ought to have most traction. However, a theme which underlines the 
findings of this report is that a public conversation about the terms on which tax incentives should be 
justified is crucial in ensuring that incentives are both fit for purpose in the short term, and sustainable 
in the long term. A system of incentives which considers tax expenditure to be a subsidy for CSOs will 
likely seem mutually beneficial when the government is enjoying favourable economic conditions and 
a populist alignment with civil society. However, when the government’s agenda is in conflict with the 
policy priorities of large swathes of civil society the same justifications might validate the states use 
of tax incentives to manipulate donor behaviour in support of its political objectives. As such, only 
a tax incentive regime built on pluralist principles and justifications will allow both the malleability 
required to make iterative improvements whilst defending against political interventionism in times 
of cross sector discord. 
It has not been possible to rank the 26 nations in this study in order of which we believe provide 
the best incentives to donors. Indeed, to do so would contradict one of the principle findings of this 
report; that for tax incentives to deliver greater levels of giving – both in terms of participation and 
financial value – the whole system under which they are offered and the interaction between different 
elements of that system must be fit for purpose. Clearly, to attempt to grade such a complex policy 
ecosystem in such a way as to allow for a meaningful ranked index would require a level of analysis 
that is beyond this research. 
Though it is not possible to credibly rank the nations in this study on their systems for incentivising 
charitable giving, it is possible to group them based on certain associated policies and political 
contexts. Fig 8 is a representation of four typologies of systems for incentivising charitable giving 
in which the 26 nations in this study can be placed. The remainder of this conclusion describes 
the characteristics of these types which we have labelled; Egalitarian, Pragmatic, Transitional and 
Restrictive systems. Spider diagrams for each type use a scoring system from one to five. Scores were 
given based on the comparative strengths and weaknesses identified in researching this report but 
the process should be seen as illustrative rather than definitive.
108 Government of South Africa (1997) Non Profit Organisations Act 1997, Chapter 2. Government Gazette
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Figure 8  Typologies of tax incentive regimes
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In some of the nations in our study, equality and fairness, from the point of view of all donors, seems 
to have been a significant consideration. In these countries tax incentives are typically offered in tax 
credits ensuring an equal benefit for as opposed to a disproportionate benefit for the wealthy (upside-
down effect). This can be done in the form of a flat tax credit which may be lower than the highest 
rate of income tax, in which case this represents a reduced incentive for the wealthy. Other systems 
may favour a credit which is stepped as donations increase to reduce the cost of incentives for small 
donations which may not be responsive to incentives (buying the base) which limits progressiveness 
in favour of pragmatism. 
Egalitarian
1
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Accessible
Simple
Sector equality Fair
Open
Generous
Inclusive
Egalitarian
Strengths:
 Equality across the income spectrum
 Inclusive of a wide range of  
charitable causes
 Sound philosophical underpinning
Weaknesses:
Complex for donors to contextualise in 
relation to their taxes and to calculate
Can lead to either a lesser incentive by 
value or by donor perception
Depending on how credits are 
implemented they can create an 
administrative burden for both claimants 
and tax authorities
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Nations following this model tend to have an inclusive approach which sees them offer equal 
incentives across a wide range of causes. However, the complexity of calculating, claiming and 
administering such a system can both reduce the effectiveness of the incentive due to poor donor 
understanding and increase the cost to government of offering the incentive. The UK and Ireland 
offer credits on a grossed-up basis which are passed on to the beneficiary which could be said 
to exacerbate this problem as detailed information is required by CSOs in order to receive the 
incentivised funds. 
The principle form of tax incentive is a deduction at the point of tax calculation. Donations are fully 
deductible subject to a cap which is sufficiently high so as not to be a disincentive but low enough to 
ensure wealthy individual donors and large corporations do not undermine the states fiscal health. 
Such a system has the benefit of simplicity because donors who file tax returns are used to claiming 
deductions. In addition, such a system entails significantly lower administrative costs than grossed-up 
tax credits. 
Though this system affords a simplicity which helps to popularise the incentive on offer and reduce 
administrative costs, this is at the cost of progressiveness. Lower income donors paying less tax 
receive a smaller incentive as a result. As such, the marginal cost of giving falls as a person’s capacity 
to afford it increases. This “upside-down” effect is pragmatic to the extent that it sacrifices equality 
for donors of a modest income, often believing this to be justified by their lower responsiveness to 
incentives. The upside down effect is exaggerated in jurisdictions where only those itemizing their 
own tax returns care able to claim deductions as such individuals tend to be higher up the socio-
economic spectrum and lower income donors are crowded out of accessing the incentive regime 
completely.
Nations operating the pragmatic model of incentives for philanthropy are favouring an approach 
which minimises state interference. Justifications for such an approach often focus on the extent to 
which donors are providing public services which the state might otherwise have to pay for. In this 
view, incentives are cost effective and pragmatic. However, running alongside this justification is the 
notion that the state simply should not tax income which has been given to charitable work because 
it cannot be considered personal consumption. As such, a strong liberal narrative supports the 
idea that people should be able to direct charitable funds at their own discretion to causes of their 
choosing. As such, the range of causes which are incentivised is typically broad.
Pragmatic
Pragmatic
1
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Accessible
Simple
Sector equality Fair
Open
Generous
Inclusive
Strengths:
 Easy for donors to understand
 Generous incentives for wealthy donors
 Inclusive of a wide range of charitable 
causes
 Simple to administer for tax authorities
Weaknesses:
 Marginal cost of giving rises with 
income level (upside down effect)
 Poorer donors receive lower incentive or 
are unable to claim
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Many nations which are in a transitional stage between a developing and an advanced economy 
in our study seem to share a number of characteristics in the way they incentive giving. Typically, a 
wide range of causes may qualify for tax incentivised gifts but there may be exceptions or different 
caps and rates of deductibility for certain causes. As well as operating a staircased system of caps, 
transitional systems have lower caps in general which in some cases present a very real disincentive 
for wealthy donors to make very large gifts. There are often significant barriers to claiming incentives 
which result from a lack of infrastructure, donor education and knowledge and capacity within tax 
authorities. This effect is compounded for lower income donors who are less likely to be able to access 
information or specialist advice. 
Despite the limitations of such a system, this approach does have a number of advantages for 
governments with limited tax incomes. Firstly, and crucially, by prioritising which causes may receive 
incentivised gifts, governments can ensure that tax expenditure (tax losses) are directed to only 
the most vital causes. This is particularly effective for leveraging the often superior resources of 
corporations in nations where multinational companies may be more receptive than individuals who 
have been under exposed to cultures of giving. In addition, by incentivising only those who are most 
receptive to incentives and putting up barriers to those who are less receptive, governments can 
maximise the impact of deductions whilst protecting themselves from excessive tax losses with lower 
caps. Importantly, as the fundamental structure of this system is similar to the Pragmatic model, by 
simply expanding the range of permissible causes and raising the caps, governments can adapt and 
liberalise over time.
Despite the above justification, the inherent inequities of the system have potentially long term 
negative consequences for the development of a culture of giving. The imbalance of a system that 
prioritises and has differing levels of incentive for certain causes over others creates opportunities for 
the politicisation of civil society. Furthermore, by crowding out ordinary people from incentives, there 
is a danger that as much of the population start to enter the middle classes, they will have developed 
negative associations about the exclusivity of philanthropy.
TransitionalTra sitional
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Simple
Sector equality Fair
Open
Generous
Inclusive
Strengths:
 A viable and affordable solution for 
transitional economies
 Equality of treatment of individuals and 
corporations
 Allows for future liberalisation
Weaknesses:
 Risk of politicisation
 Poor motivation for ordinary donors
 Barriers to claiming incentives
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For some governments the extent to which tax incentives for giving are offered broadly and 
generously is a question of balancing the needs of civil society and the will of donors with normal 
fiscal policy. This calculation could be seen as a measure of how important the government thinks 
civil society is but whilst those following the transitional model may prioritise revenues for the state, 
that model still seeks to encourage giving to some extent. However, for other governments, civil 
society is seen as something to be controlled, with tax incentives offered as a means to exclude 
organisations that do not conform to their political agenda. Whilst there may be inherent cultural 
and political differences in what causes are considered to be in the public interest, it is possible to 
objectively identify a pattern of tax policy and surrounding regulation and legislation that crowds 
out civil society organisations for political reasons. 
Those nations following this restrictive model do not allow tax incentives (for individuals at least) 
for human rights or environmental causes. In addition, they often favour corporate donors rather 
than individuals; perhaps assuming that companies with interests in the country will be less likely 
to fund causes which challenge state authority. Nigeria is an extreme example as it does not offer 
any incentives for individuals whilst Bangladesh allows companies to make deductible gifts to a 
wider range of causes than individuals. This restrictive model is consistent with a wider trend in 
global civil society law for governments to institute regressive policies which limit the capacity of civil 
society to engage in advocacy which is critical of government policy. Such policies, often justified 
for reasons of economic competitiveness, make negative assumptions about what corporations 
see as an enabling environment for business. However, by restricting criticism and free speech in 
civil society governments are unwittingly erecting barriers to the development of a culture of giving 
which not only compliments sustainable development through the services it provides but actively 
improves the environment for business by challenging corruption, holding leaders to account and 
championing the rule of law. 
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 N/A
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 Heavily politicised
 Narrow range of causes
 Individuals discouraged
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